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AN 



APPEAL 



NATIONS OF EUROPE 



AGAINST THE 



CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 



PUBLISHED AT STOCKHOLM, 



BY AUTHORITY OP BERNADOTTE, 



In March, 1813. 



BY 

MADAME DE STAEL UOLSTEIM. 



LONDON : 

PUBLISHED BY J. M. RICHARDSON, CORNHTLL. 

BOSTON : 

RE-PUBLISHED BY SAMUEL H. PARKER, 

Union Circulating Library, No. 3 School-Street, 



1813. 

^1 




PREFACE 



AMERICAN EDITION. 

WE have seen an obscure Corsican ascend the 
throne oiih^ Bourbons ; and demand m marriage the 
first princess of the proud and ancient House of Aus- 
tria. We have seen him subdue the strength and 
mind of all the continent of Europe, and compel its in- 
habitants to feel his power in whatsoever they could do, 
or abstain from ; and in whatsoever they could dread, 
or hope for. 

His daring aggressions have at length roused and di- 
rected the spirit of the North. The flood of conquest 
seems to have rolled backwards to its source. The 
rescued nations again rise, and are permitted to hope. 
Confiding in the illustrious Alexander, they encoun- 
ter all that remains of fraud, and force, to Napoleon. The 
fields of Germany, so often crimsoned in the wars of 
usurpation, and fanatic zeal, are now to receive the tor- 
rents of the conflict between relentless despotism, and 
the liberties of the world. 

Madame de Stael, by the authority of Bernadotte, 
has attempted to animate the friends of liberty, and of 
national rights in their fateful struggle. No one is 
better qualified to accomplish this purpose. She has 
watched the calamities of revolutionary and Imperial 
France, and has deplored the degradation of Europe 
with the philosophy of the other sex, and the sensibility 
of her own. 



It is true, that a thousand leagues of ocean are be» 
tween us and the Eastern Continent ; yet no people 
should feel a deeper interest in the events, which are 
there taking place, than ourselves. It is Napoleon, who 
has drawn our country into his crusade against hu- 
man nature. It is he, who compels us to exhibit the 
melancholy spectacle of a people abandoning peace, 
prosperity, and honor, for war and wretchedness. It is 
for him, that our thousand,s have perished by the sword, 
by pestilence, or famine — that American commerce 
has ceased — that civil war commenced — that our terri- 
tory is violated — that a servile war is probable — that we 
and our posterity must wear the shackles of debtors, if 
not of slaves ; and all these things are done without a 
more impervious veil, than the pretence of protecting 
aliens against their sovereigns, who claim the allegiance 
of^ birth. 

Those, who have been the weak or wicked instru- 
ments of Napoleon, will continue to palliate and pursue 
their course of folly, or of crime. Let no man console 
himself that the end of evil days approaches. The 
Russian Embassy is conceived in the spirit which die- ' 
tated the intercourse with Rose and Erskine ; with 
Jackson and Foster ; or if with better spirit. Great 
Britain has already suffered all that American hostility 
seems likely to inflict ; and will be henceforth careless 
fA America, and of her war. 

No hope remains of escaping from our miseries, till 
the people shall have learned who among their servants 
are the responsible authors of them, or until the arch 
FIEND of ^wro/>e shall have fallen. 

July 24, 1813. 



PREFACE, 

GREAT events have recently followed each other in 
such rapid succession, that the face of Europe has been 
changed within the short period which has elapsed since 
the following pages were begun. If this change had 
been of a different kind, the facts, hereafter detailed, 
would not be less authentic ; but many of my readers, 
perhaps, would not in that case regard the consequences 
which I have drawn, as convincing. The immuta- 
ble principles of justice cannot be altered by events ; 
nor can the clouds, which occasionally obscure the 
sun, extinguish ^his glorious light. But success is 
an argument of marvellous weight with the multitude. 
If Napoleon had succeeded in concluding at Moscow 
the peace which he flattered himself he should be able 
to dictate, politicians would not have been wanting to 
inform us that his demands, previous to commencing 
the campaign, were founded on justice and modertition, 
and to condemn the imprudence of Russia in not yield- 
ing to his wishes : but Napoleon has been unfortunate 



in an unjust aggression, and this is unpardonable even 
in the eyes of his apologists. The infallibility of his 
fortune is dissipated — his reputation, as a great cap- 
tain, is shaken, and none but a hired sycophant, would 
risk the assertion that, in the recent campaign, he has 
shewn the foresight even of an ordinary. generaL 
A great blow has been struck at his power ; but he 
has survived his defeats ; — he has escaped alone, 
leaving his soldiers in the midst of every imaginable 
horror : he proclaims himself in good health, when, for 
the honour of humanity, he ought to feign the agonies 
of chagrin and remorse. His physical strength is anni- 
hilated, but in imposture he redoubles his efforts. To 
supply the place of the artillery which he has lost, he 
now thunders froin, the journals, — he speaks emphati- 
cally of the grand army, — he declares it to be victorious, 
when it is no longer in existence. This army, the most 
numerous and the best equipped which had been seen 
for many centuries, cannot now furnish a single human 
voice to accuse its leader, whose blind presumption oc- 
casioned the death of so many brave men : but the 
immense plains of Russia, and of Poland, covered 
with their frozen bodies, will cry aloud to after-ages 
for vengeance. Napoleon told us, that the defection of 
a general of the allies* called for enormous new levies 

* General D'Yorck 



7 

Absurd proposition !— Fifteen thousand Prussians, who 
refused to fight for the continuation of the oppression of 
their native land, and of their sovereign, have been re- 
placed by three hundred and fifty thousand Frenchmen ! 
■ — All France is depicted as eagerly rushing to arms, to 
defend a beloved monarch— alas ! so cruelly disturbed 
in his pacific career. He attempts to terrify the people 
by the ferocity of the Russian soldier : If vi'e are to 
credit the French journals, the Russians are pouring 
forth from the depths of Asia, to introduce cannibalism, 
into the civilized world ; it is thus that nurses frighten 
children vi'ith imaginary terrors. But, happily for man- 
kind, the Russian soldier, terrible only in battle, is reli- 
gious, obedient to his superiors, accustomed to disci- 
pline, and grateful for all the benefits which are confer- 
red upon him. The French are frightened with the 
phantom of a dismemberment of their empire. But all 
the enlightened men in Europe, even in France it^ 
self, know well that nothing is wanted from France but 
the extinction of the spirit of conquest in her ruler„ 
Let the French nation, after so many dire experiments, 
conform to these views. Let them confine themselves 
within their natural limits ; they have only to express a 
wish to obtain an honourable and solid peace, and to re- 
turn to the enjoyment of all those advantages of which 
their ruler alone has deprived them. 



* The nations which have been subjugated by Napo- 
leon have manifested their sentiments on this occasion in 
a most unequivocal manner. Their sovereigns have 
only to second the impulse given by the glorious exam- 
ple of Russia, to reassume their rights. The toils which 
we have described are coarse and worn out ; but there 
are more subtle artifices, against which they must be 
upon their guard : these are the intrigues resorted to in 
the courts of Europe, to amuse them by negotiations; 
to awaken their antient rivalships, to disunite the allieSj 
and to detach them by deceitful offers from the true ob= 
jects of the war. A profound historian has remarked, 
that " the great secret of despotism is to contrive, that 
each may see only his own individual interest, and that 
jno on€ shall think of the public welfare." It is with 
states, as with individuals : the secret of universal mon- 
archy is to extinguish all zeal for the general welfare, 
by the calculating selfishness of every separate state. 
But let us hope that the public spirit of Europe will 
start up at so many powerful appeals, and the nations 
recover their independence ! 



APPEAL, 



UPON travelling through the provinces newly incor 
porated with the French empire, or those countries 
which have fallen under its sway, it is easy to perceive 
that the people have a very just sense of their situation. 
Unanimous expressions of regret for the past, cora= 
plaints of the present, and anxiety for the future, are 
every where heard. There is no peasant so ignorant, as 
not to know who is the true author of the evils which 
overwhelm his country. There is not a cottage in Eu= 
rope, however miserable and remote, where the name 
of Buonaparte has not been heard ; for many cen-^ 
turies, no man has acquired such a dishonourable ce- 
lebrity. 

In France itself the public opinion, although radically 
the same, is manifested with more reserve and hesita- 
tion. In the first place, the language of the country 
plac_es the inhabitants there immediately under the su- 
perintendence of the central police, to which foreign 
languages still present an obstacle. Besides, they com- 
pare their present condition, not with the tranquil times 
of the 18th century, but with the horrors of the revolu- 
tion, which have effaced the remembrance of them. To 
the hopes, so frequently deferred, of a great reform in 
the social order, incredulity and apathy have succeeded. 
Many persons, perhaps of honourable minds, ascribe 
to Napoleon the restoration of order and tranquillity in 
the interior : they forget that the revolutionary horrors 
ceased long before his appearance, and that he succeed- 
ed to a government which was rather feeble and va cilia* 



10 

ting than oppressive. They threaten the French nation 
with the return of terror, if this man is not permitted to 
watch over their destinies. Strange sophistry ! By a 
chimerical fear, they think to convert into benefits the 
heaviest afflictions. Revokitionary terror marched 
boldly, with an uncovered front ; it provoked resistance, 
and, even from its very nature, could not endure long. 
The present is also a moment of terror, but it is 
a terror which palsies the courage, by disguising the 
danger. It is a chef-d'oeuvre in the policy of Napo- 
leon, to give an air of stability to a condition truly 
violent and insupportable. 

Nevertheless, in France itself, the eulogies of Buona- 
parte are scarcely heard but from the lips of his slaves, 
the supporters of his power, and those who enjoy great 
personal advantages from him, and who would tremble 
for their personal security if he was overthrown. He is 
not now reduced, as at the commencement of his 
career, to purchase the silence of orators and journal- 
ists ; but he still pays very high for a good name : the 
concertos of high-flown praises, which he takes care to 
circulate from one end of his empire to the other, annu- 
ally, cost his . subjects many millions. The legislative 
body and the senate, the only remnants of republicanism, 
which he has allowed to subsist, have become, literally, 
mere courts of record. They are the imperial conser- 
vatories of flattery ;* there, amid the noisy uproar of 
bad rhetoric, they announce to the nation every bur- 
densome law, every aggravation of imposts, every new 
levy of men from an exhausted population, every new 
war which desolates humanity, as a step towards univer- 
sal pacification. But the people are deaf to these venal 
voices ; they disdain the purple of false glory, with 
which they seek to cover their misery ; they arc pro- 
foundly indifferent to public affairs ; and all those who 
do not aspire to office, confine themselves to the circle 
of domestic life. 

In preparing to develope the nature and consequences 

- * The school at Paris for the education of young persons intended for 
the theatre is called the Imperial Conservatory. TramL 



u 

of the continental system, I should be almost ashamed 
to insist upon truths generally known, if there were not 
nations, among whom it is still possible to create delu- 
sion as to their true interests, because they have been 
hitherto but distant spectators of passing events ; and 
because they have not yet ^Bade the woful experiment 
of that system, or, in other words, of the dominion of 
Buonaparte. Of the whole European states, Sweden 
alone is in this fortunate predicament. She has suffered 
great losses, but she has preserved her independence : 
She has hitherto retained the liberty of choosing her 
political relations. The time may come when she will 
no longer have it in her power. The present moment 
is decisive for her liberty, her glory, and her future 
prosperity. 

I shall abstain from drawing the character of that man 
whose success has astonished the world. Eloquence 
and declamation are useful only where it is necessary to 
excite the passions ; but, in the deliberate examination 
of a political subject, nothing ought to be exaggerated, 
and nothing advanced vaguely : the simple evidence of 
facts ought to be our guide. Whatever are the motives 
by which Napoleon is actuated ; whether by unbounded 
ambition, or by the imperious necessity of his situation, 
which admits of no recoil, the result of his actions is 
still the same. Admitting that he labours incessant- 
ly for the peace and happiness of the human race ; it 
must, nevertheless, be granted, that he does not com- 
prehend the true method of attaining these desirable ob= 
jects. Since he has held the reins of government, 
destructive wars have constantly raged, and the sources 
of public prosperity have been dried up wherever his 
influence has extended. Since, therefore, in spite of 
experience, he has for so many years adhered to the 
same maxims, it would be absurd to imagine that he 
will ever desist. 

A short retrospect of the events which preceded the 
elevation of Buonaparte, with a sketch of the state of 
Europe at that period, will be suificient to shew that he 



12 

seized upon the supreme authority, under auspices the 
most favourable for a pacific and conciliatory reign. 

The wars provoked by the first effervescence of the 
revolution lasted but a few years ; a coalition, which 
embraced nearly ^he half of Europe, was gradually and 
silently dissolved. Prussia »?as the first to withdraw, 
in the spring of 1795, and gave peace to the north of 
Germany by her line of neutrality. Holland received^ 
at the same moment, the form of government, and the 
conditions of peace, which were dictated by France, 
The kings of Spain, Sardinia, and the two Sicilies, fol- 
lowed the example of Prussia, and made a separate 
peace ; even Spain renewed her antient alliance with 
France. Several princes of Germany and Italy were 
compelled to purchase their repose at an exorbitant 
price, almost without knowing if they had really been 
at war with France. At length, in 1797, there re- 
mained no other combatants but England and Austria. 
England negotiated, and Austria concluded the treaty 
of Campo Formio : but the Directory speedily conjur- 
ed up new wars. They attacked Switzerland, which 
had been respected even by Robespierre : they drove 
the king of Sardinia from the states which were left him 
on the continent of Europe ; they led the Pope into 
captivity, drove the court of Naples into exile, and di- 
vided Italy into petty republics : they consented to the 
expedition to Egypt, and thereby irritated Turkey, and 
afforded a new motive for war to England. All these 
aggressions, made in the course of a single year, broke 
the congress of Rastadt. Russia, which, till then, had 
dealt only in promises, at length seriously entered into 
the coalition, and the campaign of the allied Austrians 
and Russians in 1799 rescued the whole of Italy from 
the French armies, much more quickly than it had been 
conquered. 

Never since the commencement of the war had the 
military situation of France been worse. The flatterers 
of Buonaparte had not failed to ascribe the salvation of 
the French republic to his return from Egypt : it has 
been his constant practice to appropriate to himself the 



13 

successes which were prepared for him by others. The 
revolutions which took place, even in the interior of the 
directory, had disorganised the armies, and caused their 
reverses. A man, who has since been called to higher 
destinies, by his genius and activity, succeeded, in a 
ministry of two months' duration, in reforming the dis- 
orders, the dilapidations, and abuses of every kind, 
which were at their height. The armies were reinforc- 
ed, provided with every requisite, and, as it were, crea- 
ted again ; in this manner general Bernadotte secured, 
as a minister, the victories which he knew how to gain 
as a soldier. As a consequence of the re-establishment 
of the armies, the English were driven out of Holland ; 
Massena resumed the offensive in Switzerland aeainst 
the Russians, and Moreau made head against the Aus- 
trions in Italy, before Buonaparte had done any thing 
more for the republic than to seize upon the supreme 
power. 

As the Emperor Paul had assisted Austria from mo- 
tives of generosity, he abandoned her from caprice : 
once more thrown upon her own exhausted resources, 
the brilliant successes of Moreau and Buonaparte, in 
1800, constrained her to sign the treaty of Luneville at 
the beginning of the following year. England, after the 
cession of Belgium, having lost all hopes of preserving 
this province for Austria, in pursuance of the dictates 
of her maritime interests, tranquillized by her victories 
in Egypt, and the consequent security of her eastern 
possessions, consented the following year to the most 
extraordinary peace which was ever made after such a 
war. Always victorious at sea, always the conqueror 
in the East and West Indies, she recognized all the rob- 
beries of France in Europe, and gave back nearly all her 
own conquests in the other three quarters of the globe 
without any compensation. 

The fate of arms in the wars terminated by this gen- 
eral pacification had often varied, but in the end the re- 
sult was advantageous to France, beyond even the most 
extravagant hopes of her paitisans ten years previous. 



14 

She had acquired the countries of Avignon and Venais- 
sin : In Italy, Savoy, Nice, and Monaco ; Geneva, 
Muhlhausen, and the Bishopric of Basle, were torn from 
Switzerland. In Germany, all the states of the Rhine 
from Alsace and Lorraine to the frontiers of Holland ; 
the iVustrian Low Countries, with Dutch Flanders, and 
the other possessions of the united provinces connected 
with it ; she had the mouths of the Scheldt, the Rhine, 
Mount Jura, and the Alps, for frontiers. This immense 
aggTandisement, which increased by almost one-fourth 
the population of the antient kingdom, was not the 
most important of the advantages which she acquired. 
The military consideration of France, which had fallen 
in repute under the latter reigns, had risen to an equal if 
not to a greater height than it had been in the days of 
Lewis XIV, Spain was also attached as firmly to the 
French republic as she had been to the monarchy. The 
new governments of Holland, Switzerland, and Cisalpine 
and Ligurian republics, were entirely devoted to the pow- 
er which had created them, and without which support 
they would have dwindled into nothing. These republics 
formed so many bulwarks around the Mother Republic. 
In a word, France had all that was requisite for her 
glory, the completion of her wishes and security for the 
future ; her preponderance on the European continent 
was such, that it became doubtful from that moment 
whether any system of equipoise could exist, or if there 
was any other guarantee against her universal empire 
than her own moderation. 

Ten years of fruitless experiments had disheartened 
the antient governments from any attempt to repair their 
losses. War, since the revolution, had assumed a char- 
acter totally different from that which it bore in the form- 
er century. It was, what had never been in Europe 
since the extinction of the religious wars, a war of opi- 
nion. But, in the wars occasioned by the reformation, 
the two parties were inspired by an equal degree of en- 
thusiasm, one for the defence of the established religion, 
and the other for that of the new doctrines. In the wars 
of the revolution, on the contrary, that moral elasticity 



15 

which is inspired by an implicit faith, was manifested 
only by the republican warriors ; while the troops of 
the antient governments fought as usual from motives 
of tlnty, and as a point of honour. Those who gov= 
erned France could, in the name of liberty, command 
immense sacrifices ; they had the entire disposal of 
persons and property. The governments of the coali- 
tions had only their usual resources, and even these 
they were obliged to manage with caution, lest they 
should augment the dangerous fermentation which 
threatened their states with the most violent explosions. 
The abolition of all abuses, the reign of justice, reason, 
and humanity, were the boons promised by France, at 
first to her own people, and which she afterwards held 
out to the universe. The people every where believed, 
therefore, that the time was come when they were to be 
released from all their troubles ; every where philan- 
thropists, badly versed in history, and superficially ac- 
quainted with human nature, dreamed of a new golden 
age ; every where intriguers, under the mask of philo- 
sophy, played the parts of demagogues. The govern- 
ments, which had hitherto been considered as the most 
free, were described as despotic, merely because they 
were sanctioned by long duration. The known excel- 
lence of a constitution, which had stood the test of ages, 
did not save it from a revolutionary storm. Not only 
were Holland and Switzerland convulsed, — ^not only did 
the disaffected Irish conspire to deliver up their country 
to France ; but in England itself there existed a faction 
which boldly announced the project of submitting the 
constitution to the crucible of theory. And, what was 
most formidable, chimerical ideas and real passions eve- 
ry where produced a similar delirium, at whatever peri- 
od they burst forth for the first time. Although France 
had returned from her first errors, every new republic 
began precisely at the same origin. Long after the chief 
actors in the great drama of the revolution in France 
had disappeared from the scene, in Italy and Switzerland 
democratic puppets strutted about on their Lilliputian 
stages, to perform the hacknied parts of republicans. In 



16 

short, the revolutionary opinions of the age seem to 
have been to nations what contagions diseases are to in- 
dividuals ; each carries their germ about with him, and 
must go through all their stages before he can be radi- 
cally cured. 

In addition to this popular opposition which the sov- 
ereigns had to encounter, the events of the last ten years 
unveiled the inherent vices of coalitions, and disclos- 
ed their insufficiency to meet such extraordinary cir- 
cumstances. The cabinets which maintained the an- 
cient laws of nations in Europe also retained their 
old prejudices. They thought that the perfection of 
diplomacy consisted m finesse ; they would have been 
ashamed not to have always some mental secret reserva- 
tions behind, or not to have an eye to ulterior objects 
beside that for which they openly laboured. The sys- 
tem of equilibrium demanded from all nations mutual 
vigilance ; petty shifts, resorted to in order to disguise 
views of aggrandisement from other powers, were, to a 
certain degree, innocent in the peaceful era which pre- 
ceded the revolution, as they could never go great 
lenp-ths. Every thing v^ras changed ; and yet there 
was no possibility of coiivincing statesmen of the fact, 
that a disinterested, open, and generous policy, could 
alone save the independence of Europe. The succes- 
ses of one of the allied powers excited the jealousy 
of the rest ; the reverses which befel one in particular 
were regarded with indifference, n:iy, with satisfiiction, 
by antient rivals. They approached each other coldly, 
and separated with disgust. 

The antient governments of the continent, which kept 
their ground in spite of the double shock of French inva- 
sion and republican principles, had, therefore, the great- 
est interest in the maintenance of peace, and the greatest 
aversion from war. For three years none of them could 
bring themselves to the resolution of re- commencing it, 
although Buonaparte, as we shall see, gave them every 
provocation. 

On the one hand, France had great reason to wish 
for peace with England. Her colonies were wrested 



17 

from her, or rendered useless, her national manufactures 
and her commerce were ruined ; in fact, the solemn 
acts and decrees of her own legislature had contributed 
as much to her misfortunes as the maritime war. Nev- 
ertheless, as the naval power of France had constantly 
decreased since the war ; as the navies of Holland and 
of Spain, since they became her allies, experienced noth- 
ing but reverses, a long repose at sea was the only meth- 
od of repairing these losses. 

In spite of all this, the peace of Amiens lasted only 
a year. The negociations which preceded the rupture 
are known to the whole world ; they bring to our recol- 
lection the observation of an antient historian, that 
we ought carefully to distinguish between the true 
causes of a war, and its pretexts, or alleged motives. 
The restoration of the sterile rocks of Malta to the order 
of St. John, exacted on the one hand and refused on 
the other, seems of itself to have been too insignificant 
an object to counterbalance the evils and the dangers of 
a war between two powers so formidable in every res- 
pect. But ulterior views presented themselves in the 
occupation of this island. England wished to secure a 
station in the Mediterranean, in the event of her ships 
being again excluded from the ports of Italy ; her min- 
isters suspected the projects of Buonaparte upon Egypt 
and the Levant, for both of vvhich Malta was the requi- 
site place of rendezvous. We shall not decide, wheth- 
er England was right in point of form in maintaining 
that she had only promised a conditional evacuation ; she 
was at all events right in the essentials of her conducts 
It has been remarked, that the English government, af- 
ter glorious and successful wars, has frequently made a 
bad peace, and that great haste has been made in repairing 
the imprudence committed. Hence it was easy to per- 
ceive, that the dangers of England coniiisted not in war 
but in peace ; that Buonaparte considered the latter as 
an useful respite to augment and exercise his navy ; that 
if England prevented him, he would call forth the im- 
mense resources of France and her dependencies, with 
all the energies of absolute power ; and, with that pro- 



18 

digious activity of disposition which is peculiar to him, 
that he would thus create, in a few years, a maritime 
force capable of keeping the seas against that of England, 
who would then see her territories threatened with in- 
vasion. 

The projects of Buonaparte were but problematical 
as to their ultimate success ; but his actions, during the 
short interval of peace, were more than sufficient to jus- 
tify the resumption of hostilities on the part of the En- 
glish government. Buonaparte has always boasted of 
his moderation in making peace, and, to a certain extent, 
he is entitled to his merit. It is, in fact, one of the 
most artful calculations in this policy. Conditions, too 
severe, might drive an adversary, when half crushed, to 
the resolution of perishing in the contest, a resolution in 
which alone there is any thing like security from such 
an enemy. But when a government, after serious mis- 
fortunes, has regained a situation somewhat supporta- 
ble, the remembrance of past dangers, and the conviction 
of its weakness, induce it to consent to every thing which 
does not immediately affect its existence. Thus Buon- 
aparte reserves the richest harvests from his wars for the 
period of peace. The instant that the arms of the sold- 
iers are grounded, (we allude to those of his enemy, for 
he never grounds his own,) he proceeds to acts which, 
in some way or other, extend his dominion. He seems 
to say to each of the states, which are opposed to him 
without success, *' You are too fortunate in being per- 
mitted to enjoy tranquiUity ; take care how you interfere 
in the aflPairs of another, with the exception of what I 
left you by the last treaty ; all the rest of Europe has fal- 
len to my share, and the most trifling opposition to these 
my incontestible rights, will be regarded as a declaration 
of war." The continental powers understood this lan- 
guage well. In order to purchase a short respite, they, 
suflfered, without murmuring, Buonaparte to accumu- 
late new means of aggression, and were crushed succes- 
sively : Such has been the history of the last ten years. 

England was far from acquiescing in this principle of 
perpetual aggression ; she protested against the occupa^ 



19 

tlon of Piedmont, Parma, and Plaisance, and the Isle of 
Elba ; she considered the prolonged stay of the French 
garrisons in Holland, and a new mission of troops 
to Switzerland, as attacks upon the independence of 
these republics, guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville. 
As to Holland, the foresight of the British ministry was 
fully justified by posterior events. After having long 
harassed the Swiss, the first consul, at length, geive 
them a constitution, nearly as good as any which they 
could have made for themselves ; but he wished that 
they should receive it from his hands, and he assumed 
the title of Mediator of Switzerland, as if he had prevent- 
ed a civil war ; whereas, the whole nation was unani- 
mous against the Helvetic government, instituted by the 
French Directors. The Valais was, from that moment, 
detached from the confederation, occupied by soldiers, 
and marked out to be incorporated with France, which 
has since been effected. 

Whatever was the origin of this second war, England 
continued it for nearly ten years, with increasing suc- 
cess, earned by an heroic perseverance, which future 
historians will duly appreciate, when they contrast it 
with the submission of twothirds of Europe. England 
was in fact, the only enemy before whom the star of 
Napolean lost its brightness ; it was England which 
sunk his fleets before Aboukir and Trafalgar, and which 
arrested the course of his conquests in Egypt, Sicily^ 
Portugal, and Spain. 

Buonaparte, in the first instance, resorted to his old 
project of a descent. He expended enormous sums, 
and persisted in his preparations for two years, desisting 
from the enterprise only when he was convinced of its 
absolute impracticability. After so many pompous 
proclamations, even he would have been greatly em- 
barrassed how to apologise for quitting his camp at 
Boulogne, without having effected any thing, if the war 
vyith Austria had not furnished hini with a pretext. 
England derived from these demonstrations the advan- 
tage of having fortified her line of coast, which a too 
great confidence in her wooden walls had made her neg. 



20 

lect. A descent could not be e&cted, but under the 
protection of a fleet, capable of coping with the English 
squadrons in the channel ; and, after many severe 
checks, the French flag had almost disappeared from 
the ocean. The superiority of the British navy, in 
numbers and discipline, is such, that their enemies think 
tliey have gained a triumph when one of their squadrons 
escapes along shore from one port to another. In vain 
did Buonaparte, at the commencement of the war, dis- 
pose of the ports of France, Holland, and Spain ; in vain 
did he afterwards take possession of those of Italy, Dal- 
matia, and of the north of Germany ; in vain did he con- 
struct ships of war in old and new dock -yards ; in vain 
did he establish a maritime conscription : so long as the 
English continue the war, without interruption, and 
blockade all the most important ports, they have noth- 
ing to fear ; French seamen cannot be trained, for want 
of experience ; and these immense preparations are mere 
schools for swimming on dry land. 

The arma.ment, of course, could do no harm to Eng- 
land in the European seas. After the first years of the 
war, in the other parts of the world, privateers were not 
to be found, because France had no colonies ; she had 
lost, in succession, not only all her own, but even those 
of Holland, which seemed to be the farthest removed 
from any attack. 

Buonaparte w^as reduced, therefore, to make war of a 
description purely negative upon the trade and naviga- 
tion of England, by excluding her ships and merchan- 
dise from the ports of France, and of the countries under 
her control. He had preached this doctrine so early as 
1800, as an infallible method of forcing England to sue 
for peace upon conditions which should annihilate her 
naval superiority ; but he was not then powerful enough 
to refuse all toleration of neutrals. In 1806, he pub- 
lished the famous Berlin decree, and, since he has nev- 
er ceased to execute, with increased vigour, what he 
calls the Continental System. He declared that the 
prohibitory regulations, which he thought proper to im- 
pose on his own subjects, were binding on all the gov- 



21 

ernments of the European continent ; and he left them 
no choice but to break off all commercial intercourse 
with England, or to be treated as the enemies of France 1 
I shall point out the injustice, the absurdity, and the 
ruinous effects, of this system, after having rapidly tra- 
ced the progress of the wars which, since 1790, have not 
ceased to desolate Europe. 

During upwards of four years, from tlie date of the 
treaty of Luneville, the peace of the continent was not 
disturbed. Its long duration would excite our aston- 
ishment, if we did not reflect on the immense labour 
which Buonaparte had to accomplish in the interior. 
He had the address to unite, in his own person, the 
double inheritance of the French republic, and of the 
old monarchy ; but he could only gradually enter into 
full possession. It was necessary to rivet his authority, 
to discover and punish conspiracies, amalgamate the 
fragments of all parties, and, by rewards ofl:ered to all, 
to compound them into one common mass of servility. 
There still existed something like public opinion in 
France : it was necessary, if we may use the expression, 
to veer round the human mind, and to steer it in a direc- 
tion opposite to that which it had hitherto preserved in 
the midst of storms ; all which demanded complicated 
manoeuvres. After having effected a counter-revolu- 
tion in affairs, it was necessary to make one in words, 
also ; and republicans, the zealous defenders of the 
most arbitrary authority, exercised by liberty and equa- 
lity, revolted at the \'ery name of king. Buonaparte 
took care to sink this title in that of emperor ; but, in 
order to produce a certain awe and reverence, he had 
recourse to the usual trappings of royalty. There was 
a general resurrection, therefore, of what was supposed 
to have been buried for ever : the titles, ceremonies, 
customs of the court, decorations, even the superannu- 
ated phrases, which kings only made use of in their let- 
ters, were dragged from their musty repositories ; and, 
after many fleeting constitutions, France received, as 
her only permanent constitution, the imperial etiquette. 
c 



Amid these dortiestic occupations, Buonaparte neg» 
lected nothing which could advance his interests in oth- 
er countries. He put the pacific dispositions of Aus- 
tria and Prussia to the severest trials : a slight chrono- 
logical sketch of all the acts of violence which he com- 
mitted during the peace, will shew who was the real 
aggressor. 

In September, 1802, an order from the first consul 
stripped the king of Sardinia of the states which still 
remained to him in Italy, and asenatus consultum order- 
ed the definitive union of Piedmont and France. In 
the month of October, upon the death of the infant duke, 
the duchies of Parma and Plaisance were united in the 
same manner i Buonaparte pretended to act upon a 
cession made secretly by the court of Madrid long pre- 
vious ; * but this cession was null, because Austria had 
eventual rights to these duchies, on the extinction of 
the branch of the Bourbons, who were invested with it. 

By these acquisitions, France extended beyond the 
Alps part of the neutral limits, which she had solemnly 
prescribed to herself in order to tranquillize Europe. 

In 1803, in the months of May and June, immediate- 
ly after the maritime war had again broken out, Buona- 
parte marched a corps d'armee into Germany, occupied 
Hanover, and seized upon the administration. George 
III. had declared war, as King of Great Britain, and not 
as Elector of Hanover. He had not drawn a single 
man from his hereditary states in Germany to serve 
against France. The latter, in the American war, had 
never thought of attacking Hanover ; Frederick the 
Great never would have suffered it. Prussia, who had 
guarranteed the north of Germany during the whole of 
the war of the*revolution, was particularly interested in 
not admitting a French army into the heart of her states : 
the Hanoverian minister demanded her protection, but 
was refused. 

* This cession was probably made by the treaty of St. Ildefonso which 
has not been published— Jt is confirmed by another treaty made at Madrid, 
March 21, 18 IG, Trans. 



23 

The invasion of Hanover was a manifest violation of 
the peace with the German empire. The Emperor 
Francis II, as the head of Germany, was, therefore, cal- 
led upon to oppose it, to declare the Empire at war, and 
to repel force by force, if protestations were in vain : 
but Austria took no part whatever. 

England, seeing that the neutrality of the Empire 
was not respected, in a just spirit of reprisal blockaded 
the Elbe and Weser. — Germany, thus abandoned by 
the two powers who alone could protect her, became 
the theatre of hostilities by sea and land. 

In March 1804, Buonaparte caused to be seized, by 
a detachment of troops, the Due d'Enghien, upon the 
territory of the Elector of Baden. I shall not regard 
this atrocity here in any other light than as an infringe- 
ment of the peace. Even supposing that the descenr 
dant of the illustrious Conde could be a subject of Buon- 
aparte, guilty of ti^eason towards him, the latter ought 
to have addressed himself to the sovereign in whose states 
the duke resided and demanded him. If the observance 
of these forms had given the Due d'Enghien time to 
escape, the intended object (that of removing a danger- 
ous character from the vicinity of France,) would have 
been attained. Several governments, it is true, extend 
the guarantee of the personal security which they owe to 
the governed, to the extent of never delivering them 
up upon any pretext. — A stranger, once received into a 
country, cannot be pursued thither for any crimes com= 
mitted elsewhere. Is it intended thereby to favour in-^ 
dividuals unworthy of such protection ?— By no means ; 
it is a noble privilege granted to the soil itself, as the 
law of asylum in temples, respected among so many 
nations, was a homage paid to the sanctity of the place. 
It is beautiful to say to all men : When even the most 
puissant monarch upon earth is your enemy, touch our 
hallowed frontiers, and you have no longer iny thing to 
fear ! 

If an armed force had seized, in the pacific territories 
of Germany, any individual, however obscure and crim^ 
inal, it would at all times have been an act of hostility 



24 

which demanded reparation ; but the circumstances of 
this catastrophe were so atrocious, that Buonaparte seem- 
ed thereby loudly to declare to the civilized world his 
contempt for the law of nations, and his intent to tram- 
ple the human race under foot. 

How striking the contrast between this barbarous 
conduct of Buonaparte towards the grandson of the great 
Conde, and the generosity of a general, a rival to the 
former, in military glory, but exhibiting in every other 
respect the most perfect contrast. The Due d'Enghicn 
came secretly to Paris during the summer of 1799 ; 
Buonaparte was then in Egypt ; the republican govern- 
ment had no longer any power, and the Bourbon party 
hoped to rise. The minister of war, General Beraa- 
dotte, then attracted the notice of all by the splendour 
of his name, and by that rapid decision on perilous oc- 
casions which is the true characteristic of men destined 
to perform a conspicuous part. The Due d'Enghien 
communicated to him, through the medium of a com- 
mon friend, his arrival at Paris, and at the same time 
offered him the sword of the constable of France, if he 
would assist in re-establishing the Bourbons on the 
throne. " I cannot serve their cause," replied Berna- 
dotte, " my honour unites me to the French nation ; 
but since the descendant of a hero,.— since a man has 
put himself in my power, no ill shall befal him. Let 
the Due d'Enghien set out this instant ! for his secret 
in three days will no longer be mine, and I shall owe it 
to my country." It is thus that a heart truly magnani- 
mous always finds the means of reconciling duties in 
appearance the most opposite. 

Every effort would have been too late to save this 
unfortunate prince ; Prussia and Austria made none ; 
Sweden and Russia in vain exhorted the diet to resent 
the outrap-e upon the Empire. This aSair of honour, 
upon whichthere ought to have been no dehberation, 
was feebly debated, and speedily passed over in silence. 

By a senatus eonsultum of the 1 Sth May, 1804, Buon- 
aparte was proclaimed emperor ; this new dignity was 



25 

recognized without scruple by the courts of Vienna and 
Berlin. 

In March, 1805, Buonaparte, who, since 1802, had 
been President of the Cisalpine republic, declared him- 
self- King of Italy. All was over, therefore, not only 
with the independence of this republic, guaranteed by 
the treaty of Luneville, (which had never been any 
thing but nominal,) but even with its existence. The 
Cisalpine republic, according to the gazettes, committed 
this political suicide, as a consequence of excessive love 
and veneration for its benefactor ; it was easy to fore- 
see that he would soon inspire the other republics within 
bis reach with a love no less extravagant. 

As the iron crown of the antient Lombatd Kings had 
been dug up, it became also natural and proper, to renew 
the name of the kingdom of Lombardy. But the Cisal- 
pine republic had already assumed the name of the Ital- 
ian republic ; transformed into a monarchy, it required 
the appellation of the kingdom of Italy. This denomi- 
nation, more vast than its object, seemed to have been 
chosen expressly with a view to announce to the states 
of Italy, which were still independent, their future desti- 

Austria hesitated to recognize Buonaparte as king of 
Italy ; and this was the principal cause of his irritation 
against that power. 

In the month of June, Buonaparte annihilated the re- 
pubhcs of Genoa and Lucca, and incorporated them with 
the French empire. If he had seized upon Piedmont, 
Parma, and Placentia, Genoa and Lucca, for the benefit 
of the Cisalpine republic, his procedure would not have 
been the less unjust ; but he would have at least gratifi- 
ed the wishes of the Italian patriots, who hoped for the 
regeneration of Italy by its union into one body. But, 
by incorporating these states with France, he shewed 
that he recognized no boundaries but his conquests, and 
that he wished to set up the chimera of universal mon- 
archy. 

The war broke out in the autumn of 1805 : From 
the foregoing observations it will be easy to ascertain if 



26 

there was any thing with which to reproach Austria, 
except her too long patience. It is curious to observe 
to what miserable shifts Buonaparte had recourse in his 
manifesto, (i. e, his discourse to the senate,) in order to 
give a colour to his aggressions. He imputes ambi- 
tious views to Austria ; but the aggrandisements of 
which he complains must be sought for with a micros- 
cope. Besides, it must be admitted that Austria had 
made her acquisitions in virtue of antient constitutional 
laws, or by cessions. With a rare impudence or sarcas- 
tic derision he reproached her, among other things, (as a 
dangerous aggression upon Switzerland,) with having 
ceded Meinau, a small island in the lake of Constance ; 
a place which none but travellers ever heard of, and the 
possession of which would have tempted no person but 
an amateur of picturesque situations to form an English 
garden. 

At the commencement of the war, the French troops 
stationed in Hanover passed through Hesse to rejoin the 
grand army. The elector of Hesse offered the king of 
Prussia to oppose their passage, if he would support 
him ; the wretched king of Prussia discouraged him : a 
few days afterwards these same troops passed through 
the Prussian states into Franconia, The king of Prus- 
sia, instead of flying to arms, negociated ; suffered him- 
self to be amused by assurances of friendship and falla- 
cious promises, and obtained no satisfaction for the vio- 
lation of his territory. 

This short but disastrous war for Austria was termi» 
nated by the peace of Presburg. In that of Luneville 
she had obtained compensations for her lost provinces, 
although by no means equivalent : Now she was called 
upon to give up all her possessions in Suabia, the Tyrol, 
her great bulwark, the state of Venice and Venetian 
Dalmatia, without any other compensation than the 
archbishoprick of Salzburg, which a prince of the House 
of Austria already possessed. 

At the beginning of the war, the princes of the Em- 
pire were at peace with France, but they were not hep 
allies, nor could they be so in defiance of the emperor 



27 

of Germany and their co-princes, while there existed a 
Germanic constitution. Those of the north remained 
neutral, under the protection of Prussia ; those of the 
south awaited events. Austria had marched troops in- 
to Bavaria ; this indispensable measure for the defence 
of her most exposed provinces was adopted with the full 
consent of the elector, who demanded only that they 
should preserve towards him an appearance of neutrali- 
ty, as the cabinet of Vienna has proved by the publica- 
tion of the correspondence with the court of Munich. 
In a short time, Bavaria, perceiving that fortune declar- 
ed for the French, ranged herself under their standard, 
and the princes of Wirtemberg and Baden followed her 
example. Then it was that the Germans devoured each 
other, not in a civil war, for they had no cause of quar- 
rel, but solely for the interests of a foreign power. The 
German princes were seen making an impious war 
against their emperor, who had so often protected them 
against the invasions of France, by exhausting the treas- 
ures and population of his hereditary states. But they 
were richly recompensed: Buonaparte distributed among 
them the spoils of their benefactor : and although scarce- 
ly a king himself, he raised the elector of Bavaria and 
the duke of Wirtemberg to the dignity of kings. 

However great were the losses which Austria experi- 
enced by the treaty of Presburg, they were nothing in 
comparison of those which followed. The court of 
Naples, forced for a long time to pay tribute to France, 
and to maintain her troops in support of this new coali- 
tion, made a feeble effort to shake oifthe yoke. Aban- 
doned by their allies upon terra jirma, exposed to all the 
fury of the conqueror, they had neither the means nor 
the courage to keep the field, and fled to Sicily ; an 
asylum which the assistance of England had secured for 
them. Two brothers of Buonaparte, one in the month 
of March, and the other in the month of June, were de- 
clared kings of Naples and Holland. The territories of 
these kings were only separated by the form of the incor- 
poration of the countries which were given to them from 
the French Empire. By a law promulgated at the same 



28 

time Buonaparte arrogated to himself an absolute tutelage 
over his brothers and other relations. In virtue of this 
law, the quality of prince-royal of the Napoleon dynasty 
implied a perpetual minority. The fii-st duty of a king 
of this new creation was a servile obedience to his mas- 
ter. This crown, this radiant circle, with which Buon- 
parte wished to decorate the brows of his brothers or 
his allies, was but the last link of a chain of which he 
held the other end, and which he could draw tight at 
pleasure ; and the declamations of philosophers against 
kings, as croiuned slaves, were literally verified. 

The Germanic Empire was still recognised by the 
peace of Presburg. Buonaparte, however, always kept 
his armies in Germany, in order to defend all the out- 
rages committed by princes of the Empire even against 
their fellow- states ; he encouraged the depredations 
committed by the strong upon the weak, and by the sat- 
ellites of his power upon the loyal and patriotic subjects of 
their country. The plunder of the imperial cities, of the 
equestrian order, of the petty kings who were pacific, 
and, in general, of all those states who had neither the 
power nor the will to make war against France, served 
to cement the confederation of the Rhine, into which no 
prince could be admitted, unless he had plundered his 
neighbours. It was about this period that a German 
bookseller,* in the midst of this pretended peace, in the 
bosom of his country, was shot, by order of a French 
mihtary commission, for having dared to publish that 
Germany was degraded :■ — a strange method of refuting 
his assertion ! 

In the month of August, there at length appeared an 
act, constituting the confederation of the Rhine. Lay- 
ing aside the constitutional regulations, which were 
never executed, this was at bottom nothing but a mutu- 
al compact, by which Buonaparte guaranteed to the 
princes of Germany the usurpations made under his 
auspices : they, in return, gave up to him the lives and 
properties of their subjects, promising to assist him in 

* Palm. 



29 

all the wars of aggression which he mighl still have in 
contemplation. 

The members of the confederation annulled^ of their 
own accord, their obligations to the Empire, in virtue 
of which they held their fiefs. The emperor of Austria 
acceded to this arrangement by resigning the dignity of 
electoral chief of the Empire, and all the rights which 
belong to it. The treaty of Presburg recognized these 
rights ; but, in order to maintain them, a new war 
would have been necessary. Prussia, since 1795, had 
separated her cause from that of the Germanic Empire, 
and had given the pernicious example of making a sepa- 
rate peace. The ecclesiastical princes, who alone were 
sincerely attached to the Germanic cause, had ceased to 
exist, in consequence of secularizations : among most 
of the other princes, the sacrifices of Austria for the " 
Empire, during the long war of the revolution, had been 
rewarded only by ingratitude or coldness. The Aus- 
trian monarch, therefore, voluntarily laid down his an- 
tient crown, admitted by all Europe to be the first in 
dignity, and which for five centuries had adorned the 
house of Hapsburg. It will ever be recollected with 
sensibility, that equity and a paternal solicitude for the 
oppressed signalized the last acts of the imperial author- 
ity. It was easy to blame the debility of the Germanic 
constitution while it still existed, but it required a sad 
experience to make known the full extent of the evils 
which its fall was destined to bring upon Germany and 
Europe. 

The hour of Prussia was come : her king had been 
long plunged in a fatal infatuation ; his eyes were at 
length opened, but it was too late. He was incessantly 
told by his sycophants that his pacific disposition w^is 
the acme of political wisdom ; and he was persuaded 
that, by persisting in neutri-liiy, he would finaliv obtain 
the management of the equilibrium of Europe : Buona- 
parte was himself one of the most undisguised flatterers 
of this unhappy monarch when he called hirn his natural 
ally. Prussia was still entire : the secularizations had 

D 



amply compensated her for the loss of her provinces be- 
yond the Rhine. Upon adding her share in the last par- 
tition of Poland, it will be fonnd that she was stronger 
in population and in resources of every kind, than she 
had been since the days of Frederick. But the latter 
sovereign would have prevented instead of awaiting 
events ; he would not have regarded the politics of the 
south of Germany as indifferent to him ; he would not 
have permitted Austria to be cooped up within her he- 
reditary states behind the Inn ; and, in concert with 
her, he would have constructed a barrier sufficiently 
strong to resist the overflowings of ambition. 

The ruin of Prussia was chiefly owing to a false confi- 
dence in her former successes. During eleven years, 
her civil and military institutions had not been put to 
the test ; she had not perceived their insufficiency even 
after so many changes in Europe. In general, this is 
the danger with which neutrals are menaced — inactivity, 
during the great contests which bring into play all the 
energies of human nature, diminishes those of govern- 
ments and nations. It has been said that neutrals ought 
to preserve their strength, because combatants are mu- 
tually exhausted. This is false reasoning ; the strength 
of nations consists far less in masses of men or rich treas- 
uries, than in the impulses which are given to them by 
patriotism and military honour. 

The Prussian ministry proved but too plainly how 
far they were from thinking of any hostile project, by 
lendina: themselves to the most insidious propositions 
of the cabinet of St. Cloud. Overlooking the violation 
of her own territories, Prussia consented to cede provin- 
ces to which she had ho title, and to receive in exchange 
the electorate of Hanover, which French troops had, in 
fact, occupied, but which the king of England had by 
no means given up. To sum up his duplicity, Buona- 
parte negociated a peace with the British government, of- 
fering- the restitution of Hanover, while, at the same in- 
stant, he invited Prussia to take possession of it. Thus, 
at the moment when he was about to fall upon her, he 
took care to embroil her with England. In order to 



tranquillize her as to the confederation of the Rhine, he 
prepared to form a northern league with those German 
states, which were not yet comprehended in the former. 
But when the king of Prussia wished to put this league 
into execution, Buonaparte excepted from it the Hanse- 
atic cities ; adding, that his tenderness for the indepen- 
dence of the people of the north would impose upon 
him the necessity of protecting all those who refused to 
confederate. In the mean time the French armies re- 
mained in Germany, and approached the Prussian fron- 
tier : the armaments, which were indispensable for Prus- 
sia to preserve her frontiers, were considered as hostil- 
ities ; war, therefore, burst forth in full fury. 

The Prince of Hesse, afraid that his countr}^ would 
become the theatre of the war, requested the belligerents 
to allow him to remain neutral. His proposal was ea- 
gerly acceded to at the French head-quarters, and receiv- 
ed with coldne^ by the king of Prussia. Fifteen days 
after having recognised the neutrality of this prince^ 
Buonaparte, once more victorious, and having no iorjger 
any thing to feai , stripped him of all his states, aggra- 
vating his atrocity by the most odious imputations. A 
memorable lesson for neutrals ! — the elector of Saxony, 
at first the voluntary ally of Prussia, afterwards turned 
his arms against her, without any reason but her misfor- 
tunes, and was recompensed with the title of king, and 
the duchy of Warsaw. Neutrality is a crime in the 
eyes of Buonaparte, because it is a demonstration of in- 
dependence ; defection, on the contrary, deserves to be 
encouraged : besides, a line of conduct which depresses 
the dignity of a sovereign is always the beginning of an 
intimacy with that man who considers personal esteem 
as a constraint. 

We are not writing the history of the wars of Napo- 
leon, — we are rather sketching the history of his treaties. 
It will be sujfficient to recal the immediate consequen- 
ces of the peace of Tilsit. The foundation of the new 
kingdom of Westphalia for the Napoleon dynasty ; the 
accession of most of the princes of the north of Germany 
to the confederation of the Rhine ; the duchy of War- 



32 

saw, the nucleus of the future re-establishment of the 
kingdom of Poland, an useful engine in the hands of an 
adroit politician, and which he might turn at pleasure 
against Russia or Austria ; the re-establishment of the 
republic of Dantzic, whose independence was guaran- 
teed, but whose subjection might easily have been fore- 
seen, since it would furnish France with a port in the 
Baltic, and a strong place d'arms — finally, military 
routes reserved to the French armies through the Prus- 
sian states, so that in future no barrier should be inter- 
posed to their progress to the Russian frontiers, — such, 
in an evil hour, were the conditions to which the cabi- 
net of St. Petersburgh acceded ! 

This treaty was concluded in the summer of 1807 ; 
before the end of that year Buonaparte had seized upon 
two kingdoms, Portugal and Etruria ; and had entrap- 
ped Spain so firmly, that he thought himself secure of 
his prey. ♦ 

The occupation of Portugal, a kingdom tributary to 
France since the peace °of 1801, was founded upon the 
pretext of the admission of English vessels into her ports: 
while the French government endeavoured to tranquil- 
lize the Prince Regent, and to make him believe that the 
troops which had entered his kingdom were intended 
only to guard the coasts ; and that he should be always 
respected as a sovereign of Portugal, provided he com- 
mitted hostilities against England ; the British govern- 
ment opened the eyes of the court of Lisbon to their 
true interests, and induced them to embark for the Bra- 
zils. Buonaparte then declared, in his oracular style, 
that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign ; but 
it happened quite otherwise. It would, indeed, have 
ceased to reign if it had remained, and would have been 
condemned to drag out a captive existence at the mercy 
of the usurper. The honourable flight of the court of 
Lisbon to another hemisphere proved that extremes are 
most proper to be resorted to with such an enemy. The 
day on which the prince of the Brazils set sail from Lis- 
bon was the aera of a new splendour for that monarchy, 
fornierly so victoriousj but which had fallen into decay 



S3 

for upwards of two centuries. The Brazils were im- 
proved by the residence of the court, by the riches and 
the new inhabitants which flowed into them : Portugal 
was reconquered for its legitimate sovereign by these 
very English, who are accused of abandoning their al- 
lies ; and the Portuguese troops, animated by a new 
enthusiasm, assisted in the deliverance of Spain, and will 
soon, perhaps, present themselves on the frontiers of 
France. 

Spain, during eleven years, to her great loss, was the 
most faithful and devoted ally of France. The French 
government disposed as it pleased of the fleets, the army, 
and the treasures, of that monarchy. The court of 
Madrid carried its complaisance so far as to permit the 
troops destined for the invasion of Portugal to pass 
through Spain. This was the signal for its ruin. All 
the world knows by what machinations the royal family 
were, in the first instance, divided among themselves, 
afterwards cajoled towards Bayonne, and how an abdica- 
tion was extorted from Ferdinand VII. who had no al- 
ternative allowed him, but to sign it or die. In this 
business the allies of Buonaparte ought to have foreseen 
the fate which awaited themselves, and from which the 
greatest zeal in his service and the most absolute devo- 
tion to his will can never save them. But this exter= 
minating ally trusted in their illusions, in their pusillan- 
imity, and, Ibove all, in their precarious situation ; 
since, not only the kings of new creation, but also the 
antient confederate princes, had no other supporter but 
himself, their true and legitimate rights being swallowed 
up in their usurped titles. After the proceedings of 
Buonaparte in Spain, no person can flatter himself that 
he will confine himself to such robberies as are consist- 
ent with the interests of his domination ; he has shewn 
himself determined to sacrifice sovereigns and their 
subjects to the caprices of his vanity. For a long period 
Spain had been a kingdom held together for his benefit ; 
the government collected their resources from the peo- 
ple on his account alone. The whole of this immense 
possession, as convenient as it was profitable, he risked 



34 

to increase the glory of his dynasty ; to place a Buona- 
parte upon that throne, occupied, after the illustrious 
descendants of the Goths, by the houses of Hapsburg 
and Bourbon. Admitting that it was easy for him to 
mistake the true character of the Spaniards, it must at all 
events be admitted, that his enterprize was badly calcu- 
lated in every respect. He ought not to have trusted 
that the nation in general would consent to a change ef- 
fected by open violence ; besides the members of the 
royal family, who were prisoners in France, there exist- 
ed several claimants to the throne of Spain. In order to 
support an intrusive king, he must have had a French 
army constantly in the peninsula, where the English 
could, from every harbour, pour in assistance to the dis- 
affected. Besides, it was clear that the colonies would 
emancipate themselves on such an occasion, and that the 
gold of the mines of Potosi and Mexico would cease to 
flow into Madrid, and from thence to France. 

But, what was most singular in the affair of Bayonne, 
was, that Buonaparte therein manifested his true opin- 
ions of the rights of the very people whose protector this 
Republican Emperor had so often declared himself. He 
treated the Spanish people as a herd of cattle, which 
their proprietor is willing to dispose of to the highest 
bidder. Even if the cession of Ferdinand VH. in fa- 
vour of the Napoleon dynasty had been voluntary, it 
would have had no validity without the ilbnsent of the 
nation. There is a great difference between the property 
of individuals and political prerogatives. Hereditary 
sovereignty is a right purely personal, and consequently 
is not transmissible except in the established order of 
succession. If this order is broken by the extinction or 
exclusion of a reigning family, the nation only can dis- 
pose of the vacant throne. Certainly Buonaparte is 
powerfully interested in recognizing this eventual right 
of election ; for, by virtue of what other title but the 
the shadow of a popular election does he lay claim to 
the sovereignty of France ? 

It is nearly five years since the first insurgent inhabi- 
tants were massacred at Madrid : during these five 



35 

years, Spain has been the tomb of the French and allied 
troops ; she has also been the quicksand in which the 
treasures of Napoleon have been sunk, and her subjuga- 
tion is at this moment as far distant as ever. This beau- 
tiful country, so highly favoured by nature, has been 
desolated to such a degree as to present in many places 
the aspect of a desart ; the flower of the Spanish youth 
has mouldered away, or languishes in sad captivity ; and 
all this that Joseph Buonaparte, who was already in 
tranquil possession of the throne of Naples, might (in 
spite of his own wishes) replace Ferdinand VII. on the 
throne of Spain ! Can it be doubted, thgt this young 
prince, whose faculties were benumbed by a confined 
education, if he had been permitted to reign, would have 
placed himself implicitly under the tutelage of his pow- 
erful ally, and that the latter, by directing his councils, 
could have reformed the abuses of the government, res- 
tored its antient prosperity to the Spanish nation, and 
made himself adored ? 

After this recapitulation of events since the peace of 
Presburg, there is nothing particular to add, as to the 
causes of the last war with Austria in 1809. I shall not 
however refer to the Austrian manifesto such of my 
readers as are not yet convinced of the justice and ne- 
cessity of this war. Among other inconveniences which 
attend treaties by which the legitimacy of the new 
French authorities is recognized, an almost insurmount- 
able impossibility has arisen of drawing up a good man- 
ifesto. The pen of the diplomatist, as well as the sword 
of the warrior, was checked by the recollection of a too 
servile subserviency to existing circumstances. What 
was not without example, was not without probability ; 
and, the secret fear of being forced to repeat these sub- 
missions, imposed caution and silence. There was only 
one good manifesto left ; it consisted in throwing the 
gauntlet for a war of extermination, and in saying — 
" In former treaties we have compromised our dearest 
interests, and sacrificed our most sacred duties : this 
man, whose usurpation we have recognized against our 
conviction ; whom we have permitted to sit among us, 



36 

legitimate sovereigns, is guided neither by laws nor by 
good faith. We appeal to the universe against him : 
Although far less powerful than him, we arm once more, 
because he leaves us no alternative but to await exter- 
mination at his hands, or to prevent it !" 

It is easy to observe, that, since the revolution, every 
new war with France was commenced under disadvan- 
tages, infinitely greater than the preceding ; and, in pro- 
portion as the danger increased, hopes of assistance were 
diminished. Buonaparte took care to compromise more 
and more each power with its neighbour. Prussia had 
remained an iiidifferent spectator of the misfortunes of 
Austria, in 1805 ; in the following year Austria looked 
on, while Prussia was ruined. The small portion of 
Prussian Poland, which Russia received by the treaty 
of Tilsit, may be considered as a compensation for the 
expenses of the war. In 1809, Russia, pressed by 
France to take an active part in the war, made only a 
demonstration ; but at the peace she accepted a consid- 
erable portion of Gallicia. In the recent campaign, both 
Prussia and Austria furnished contingents against her ; 
and, by contributing efficaciously to overwhelm her, 
prepared for themselves — God knows what destiny ! 

All that has t^een said as to the ruinous effects of 
neutrality, premature treaties and co-operations, more 
or less direct with France, has not for its object to blame 
the antient governments of Europe, for which we have 
the highest respect. Their situation since the revolu- 
tion, and particularly since the usurpation of Buonaparte, 
has been, in fact, quite novel and truly embarrassing. 
The first shock of any great and unexpected reverse of 
fortune precipitated the conclusion of peace ; in order 
to preserve it, it was necessary to yield to Buonaparte in 
every thing : to have him for an enemy was to be in 
imminent danger ; his friendship is infallibly pernicious, 
but it is not so immediately ; and he neglects nothing 
to fascinate the eyes of those whom he caresses, while 
he meditates their ruin. It is to be wished that the con- 
tinental powers would mutually grant an amnesty for 
all that has passed under this malignant influence, as 



37 

soon as one of them gives proofs that it sincerely wishes 
for its independence, arising out of the deliverance of 
Europe. 

The Austrian government, in 1809, after making 
a solemn appeal to the patriotism of the people, shew- 
ed no perseverance. They were thereby deprived of 
the faculty of having recourse again to extraordinary 
means, and this cooling of the public opinion was a 
much more dangerous evil than the loss of some pro- 
vinces. Austria lost, by the peace of Schoenbrunn, the 
frontier of the Inn, Salzburg, a portion of Gallicia, por- 
tions of Carinthia, Carniola, and Croatia : the latter dis- 
tricts, under the name of the Illyrian Provinces, were 
yielded immediately to the French Empire ; the re- 
mainder were presented to her allies. But what signifi- 
ed a district more or less, when the proportions were al- 
ready so prodigiously altered betweenthe two empires? 
Even during the war. Napoleon incorporated the Ec- 
clesiastical States with France, stripping the Church, 
which he affected to respect, and the venerable old man, 
who thought he had performed an embassy of peace, by 
placing the crown on his head. Soon afterwards he de- 
posed his brother, the King of Holland, for not having 
been a good Douanier in the prohibitive system which 
reduced his subjects to beggary. The Dutch nation, 
formerly a model of republican virtues, victorious in 
the two Indies, the rival of England, was so humbled, 
that he dared to tell them in the face of Europe, that as 
they inhabited a country which was washed by French 
rivers, or such as had become French, they must, as a 
matter of course, be incorporated with France. This, 
I presume, was the first time that the hypotheses of ge- 
ology were ever adduced as arguments in politics ! 

Subsequently he united the Hanseatic cities : — those 
republics, always pacific, long oppressed by France, 
which had sold them a momentary protection, at an ex- 
orbitant price ; — the shores of Germany, from the mouth 
of the Ems to that of the Trave ; and a great extejit of 
territory in the interior, composed partly of the Hanove- 

E 



rian States of the King of England, and partly of those 
of other princes, against whom France never had the least 
cause of complaint. Two prefectures were even taken 
from the Kingdom of Westphalia, without the brother of 
Napoleon being apprised of it in any other way than by 
the decree inserted in the Moniteur. 

Such, therefore, was this monstrous federal system, 
which was rapidly verging towards universal monarchy. 
Every other arrangement was only provisional ; the final 
term was always an incorporation with the Grand 
Empire. The same poHcy which guided Buonaparte 
in 1 797, in Italy, in making and unmaking ephemeral 
republics, was now exercised on a larger scale and un- 
der despotic forms. The nations ranged under French 
controul may learn how highly they are rated in the eyes 
of the master of their masters, by reflecting on the lan- 
guage of Buonaparte to his young nephew, when he 
invested him with the Grand Duchy of Berg : " Re- 
member always, that your first duties are towards me^ 
the second towards France, and the third towards the 
people entrusted to your government." The exam- 
ple of the Bourbons dethroned in Spain, and of Louis 
Buonaparte stripped of his crown in Holland, teach all 
confederate princes that it is a fine thing to be a devoted 
ally ; that it is a fine thing to be connected by consan- 
guinity to the new dynasty, which every thing contri- 
butes to preserve from the destiny which awaits human 
events ! The most highly favoured may at least expect 
from Napoleon the politeness of Polyphemus. Ulysses 
having presented him with some excellent wine ; " My 
friend," said the grateful cyclop, " I shall eat you 
among the last of your companions ! !"* 

After the last defeat of Austria, after the change ef- 
fected in the political system of this power by the mar- 
riage formed between an Austrian princess and Napole- 
on, all hopes had disappeared that the Continent would 
throw oifthe yoke, while Prussia continued her alliance 
with France. Happily for the world, Buonaparte^ 
blinded by his pride, committed a great error in break- 

* OuT<v eya TtvMarov i^c.uxi fUTot, oi? iragaiiri, Odyssey^ X. 370. 



ing a peace which was so useful to him, and attacking 
that monarchy whose armed force had only fought as 
auxiliaries and at a distance from their own frontiers. 

Thrice had Russia engaged in coalitions against 
France, and always in a disinterested and generous 
manner. Paul I. was disarmed by the flatteries of the 
Chief Consul ; it required a deeper hypocrisy to fascin- 
ate Alexander, a sovereign equally humane and mag- 
nanimous, who, since 1805, has been hailed by Ger- 
many as her future deliverer. Napoleon succeeded ia 
persuading him that the obstinacy of the English in main- 
taining their maritime preponderance was the sole cause 
of all the misfortunes of the civilized world ; that 
France, having lost her colonies, her navigation, and the 
greatest part of her commerce, had been driven, in spite 
of her wishes, to aggrandisements ; that the sovereignty 
of the seas must be wrested from England, by vigorous- 
ly excluding her ships and merchandize from the ports 
of Europe ; that, in this event, whatever was burden-^ 
some in the Continental System would cease of itself, 
and that all the branches of industry would take a new 
turn, while the general peace would be guaranteed by 
the union of the two preponderating powers. 

For many years the declaimers and bettors against 
Buonaparte had foretold, as the result of his prohibitory 
measures against England, the stagnation of his com- 
merce, the ruin of his manufactures, the misery of his 
people, public bankruptcy, insurrection, and the over- 
throw of his states. But all these predictions were not 
exactly verified. Buonaparte had of himself not a little 
damped these exaggerated hopes, by putting off this ca- 
tastrophe for thirty years. However closely the coasts 
were watched by clouds of douaniers, it was discovered 
that a great quantity of English merchandize had slip- 
ped into the Continent and even into France. Domi- 
ciliary visits were made every where, colonial produce 
was confiscated, and the English manufactures were 
burnt. While these commercial auto da fe'^s were cel- 
ebrated with ridiculous pomp, Buonaparte, in order to 
cover the deficiency of his finances, caused by the inac- 



40 

tivity of the doiianiers, opened his ports himself by giving 
licences to the English vessels ; i. e. he seized upon all 
contraband trade as an imperial monopoly. Russia had 
therefore a right to complain that France was the first to 
break her engagements : she might have complained of 
a thousand other vexations : she contented herself with 
re-establishing under a neutral flag a feeble portion of 
her antient commercial relations after having for several 
years continued the enormous and fruitless sacrifice of 
her foreign commerce. To conclude, she awaited, in 
a calm and dignified attitude, the most impudent and 
atrocious aggression. 

Buonaparte published no manifesto on the subject of 
this war : he relied too much on his good fortune to ap- 
peal to justice. Nevertheless, by his own confession, 
his only motive was the admission of English vessels 
and English merchandize into the ports of Russia. 
This dreadful conflict between the Russians, single- 
handed, on the one hand, and on the other a multitude 
of nations such as had not been seen for ages united 
under one flag ; of Germans and Italians of all denom- 
inations ; Dutchmen and Croats, already become French 
subjects J Swiss, Portuguese, and Spaniards, torn from 
their country ; this devastaing war, which dragged the 
youths of Western Europe to the confines of Asia ; 
this holy league — Will posterity believe it ?— was an- 
nounced to the world as a crusade against sugar and 
cofiee, and muslins and laces ! Is the human race to be 
thus trifled with ? And how long will the most enlight- 
ened nations sacrifice themselves patiently, to amuse the 
ennui, flatter the vanity, and allay the ambition of a sin= 
gle man ! 

But, perhaps, it may be objected to all we have said, 
that, if the policy of France be oppressive, that pf Eng- 
land is not less so, and that her maritime despotism is 
equally contrary to the welfare of other nations as is the 
spirit of conquest which animates the French govern- 
ment. Assertions, the most devoid of truth, incessant- 
ly repeated with assurance and inculcated with due em- 
phasis, end in making an impression upon unthinking 



41 

minds, whose idleness reposes amidst vague ideas. We 
shall, therefore, examine what is signified by this cry of 
the liberty of the seas ; we shall prove that it has no direct 
meaning ; and that, if it is possible to tyrannise upon 
the ocean, it is not England, but France, which attempt- 
ed it, so far as her maritime force would permit. 

England, at present, possesses the greatest naval force 
which is ever bfeen known ; in short, the navies of all 
other powers put together would not equal it. If this 
be an evil, it is one of those which have been brought 
upon Europe during the last twenry years ; for, in the 
American war, the united navies of France, Holland, and 
Spain, gave England abundance of trouble, and she res- 
pected the armed neutrality of the three maritime pow- 
ers of the north, although it was extremely contrary 
to her interests. The equilibrium could only be res= 
tored by a peace, during which England disarmed^ 
while trading- vessels alone composed the navy of other 
nations. 

Supposing that there was an universal peace. No 
person ever accused the English, to my knowledge, of 
harassing, in time of peace, the navigation of other pow- 
ers, however feeble ; no person has reproached them 
with not observing, towards their enemies, the laws of 
war, sanctioned among civilized nations. It is, there- 
fore, upon their conduct towards neutrals alone that the 
question hinges. 

In order to probe this matter to the bottom, we must 
not lose sight of the nature of a maritime war. It is 
undertaken chiefly for the interests of commerce ; it 
would become completely illusory, if it did not give 
permission to attack in all ways the commercial naviga- 
tion of the enemy. It is this principle which has author- 
ised tlie practice of seizing upon all the property of sub- 
ject enemies, exposed upon the high seas, or even to 
destroy them, which, in wars upon terra firma, is dep- 
recated as barbarous. 

Of the two belligerents by sea, the weakest will al- 
ways naturally favour neutrals, who can render them 
the most important services. Are her merchant- vessels 



42 

coQfined in port for want of a squadron to protect them ? 
the neutrals become her carriers ; they transport mer- 
chandize between the mother- country and her colonies ; 
and if they are requested, even between the two hostile 
countries ; and, after all, the subjects of the power 
which has recourse to them, only lose by this expedi- 
ent the proiits of the freight, retaining those of the trade 
itself. 

There could not be a more lucrative situation than 
that of a neutral in a maritime war, if the belligerents 
were dupes to these pretended rights of neutrality, and 
put no restrictions upon them. Their ships would be 
wasted ,in fruitless cruises, if they did not now and then 
humble an enemy for the honour of the flag, and all the 
nrofits of the war would accrue to the states which had 
borne no share in the risk. 

It is useless, in order to elucidate this subject, to go 
back to the principles of the law of nature, the decisions 
of which are often vague, without the concurrence of 
positive laws founded upon treaties ; but more particu- 
larly insufficient for relations of so complicated a nature 
as those of the commerce of civilized nations. The 
rights of neutrality can only be limited, therefore, by 
the conflict between the disadvantages of reciprocal ne- 
gociations, and those consequent upon, a rupture. It 
will be necessary for the belligerents, for instance, to 
ascertain if they ought to prefer the war in disguise 
which neutrals wage against them, to open war ; where- 
as, neutral states must consider whether it is their inter- 
est to subject their navigation to some constraint, or to 
expose it entirely. 

To maritime belligerents the right is generally grant- 
ed of preventing the importation of goods contraband 
of war into an enemy's port, and the rights of blockad- 
ing one or more of his ports, which in cases of contra- 
vention justifies the confiscation of neutral vessels. No 
dispute has arisen as to the right to seize the property 
of an enemy in neutral vessels, and consequently to vis- 
it them and to blockade their coasts. 



43 

During the war with America, armed neutrality pro- 
claimed the principal that " the flag covered the mer- 
chandize." England never recognised this principle, 
for good reasons. This claim, if pushed to extremities, 
would not only place belligerents, at the mercy of the 
neutral powers, so far as goods contraband of war are 
concernedjbut would admit of troops being conveyed in 
neutral vessels for the invasion of an enemy's territory. 

The blockade of a coast differs from that of a partic- 
ular port only in the extent of the measure. If a pow- 
er has the means of effecting it, why has she not the 
right also ? If it is difficult to blockade a whole coast as 
vigorously as a single port, neutral vessels will enter 
and depart at their own peril. # 

Finding his shores blockaded, Buonaparte, by the 
Berlin decree, declared the British isles themselves in a 
state of blockade ; as, in a quarrel, an insult is retorted 
on the person offering it. The English government 
may well despise this stupid menace, since it would re- 
quire immense naval resources, to realize it ; and those 
which France possesses are almost useless. If it were 
an act of reprisal, it would only fall upon neutrals ; and 
it was a violation of their rights, infinitely more atro- 
cious than any thing that England had ever done. Buon- 
aparte declared to all maritime states : " I have not a 
single ship of war at sea to prevent your vessels from 
visiting England ; but, I forbid you to send them there, 
I cannot hinder English vessels from freely navigating 
the seas ; but, I order you to exclude them from your 
ports. If you do not prohibit all intercourse with Eng- 
land, all is over with you : I shall attack you, nor shall 
I lay aside my arms until your coasts are guarded by 
my own douaniers." 

This is not all. As there were maritime states which 
Buonaparte could not attack by land, — among others, 
America, — he made, expressly on their account, an or- 
dinance, which bears : that, " After any neutral vessel 
shall have been visited by any English ships of war, 
and shall have touched, by their orders, at any English 
port^ and paid duties there, her flag is denationalized ; 



44 

and, wherever she is seized, she shall be declared a law- 
ful prize." 

In this way Buonaparte punishes neutrals, for the 
weakness which puts it out of their power to oppose the 
claims of the British government. As a motive for 
this outrage, he says that it behoves every state to main- 
tain its own independence. Granted : — but it is a duty 
which she owes to herself^ and not to you : Who gave 
you the right to call her to account ? Besides, no obli- 
gation is binding bej^ond a possibility. 

From all that has been said, it results, that, if England 
sometimes handles neutrals roughly, Buonaparte never 
tolerates any whatever, and destroys, as far as lies in his 
power, even to thelfehadow of the rights of neutrality. 
The violence of his proceedings being such, while his 
ships are blockaded in port, what would his conduct be 
if he were powerful at sea ? 

The French minister incessantly proclaims the liber- 
ty of the seas as the sublime object of the continental 
system ; it is the watchword for every new war. Nev- 
ertheless, in all the negotiations with England, this same 
minister has never paid neutrals the compliment of pro- 
posing any stipulation in their favour for the future. 

For twenty years Europe has been deluged with dec- 
lamations and calumnies against the British govern- 
ment : for ten years and more the journals and other 
political writings, published in England, have been con- 
traband in France and in all the countries under her in- 
fluence. Facts are disfigured by mutilated extracts from 
the opposition newspapers. If the new French cate- 
chism were to contain a lecture on the sacred rights of 
the Napoleon dynasty, one of the articles of their creed 
would be " the English are the tyrants of the Ocean and 
the eternal enemies of the Continent.'^'' We have al- 
ready refuted the first of these imputations ; the sec- 
ond will disappear upon examining the true relations of 
England with Europe. 

The English are described as a nation of shopkeep- 
ers. This may be said in as much as commerce is one 
of the principal bases of their riches and their power ; 



45 

and, consequently, in public transactions, their govern- 
ment ought never to lose sight of commercial advanta- 
ges ; but it is an arrant falsehood to say that commerce 
is their sole occupation, their only resource, and that no 
other materials enter into the admirable structure of their 
national prosperity. 

The occupation of a merchant, on a limited scale, 
from incapacity or aversion to other pursuits, with a 
desire for gain disproportioned to the means of acquir- 
ing it, produces that mercantile spirit vv^hich is justly 
condemned as selSsb, and contrary to a noble and dis- 
interested nature. But, when commerce is conducted 
on a large scale, by a great and enlightened nation, whose 
social institutions are chefs d'ceuvres of reason and ex- 
perience, among whom the sciences and learning, the 
mechanical arts and agriculture, far from being neg- 
lected, are brought to perfection, in proportion as mer- 
cantile speculations become extended ; then commierce 
necessarily leads to liberal views and renders every cit- 
izen a cosmopolite. Not only in order to be flourish- 
ing do they require peace and liberty ; but a commer- 
cial people, as a matter of necessity, are interested that 
others should enjoy the same benefits. War takes off 
hands from the manufactories, while it consumes a quan- 
tity of produce ; it impoverishes, therefore, in general, 
the two belligerents ; at least one of them. Liberty, and 
the reign of equitable laws, to the exclusion of every ar- 
bitrary act, secure property ; and it is upon this secu- 
rity that public and private credit rest. Can we for a 
moment suppose that a commercial nation 'will rejoice 
in the oppression and ruin of those with whom they car- 
ry on trade ? They could no longer find any markets, 
for a poor country has nothing to sell, and has no mon- 
ey with which to purchase. Petty merchants may be 
jealous of each other, may wish to seize upon a monopoly, 
or grasp at merchandize, and use all means to succeed ; 
and the politics of some states have frequently resem- 
bled these vices of tradesmen. But such artifices can- 
not be profitable in the main : in commercial affairs of 



46 

states, as of individuals, nothing is durable but that 
which is voluntary in every sense of the word, and 
founded upon mutual advantages. When a nation has 
acquired a superiority in most branches of human indus- 
try ; when their navigation intrepidly visits every portion 
of the globe, and traverses the ocean as securely as the 
waters of a canal ; when the most valuable luxuries of 
all countries pour into their harbours as well as the first 
objects of necessity : when it possesses the art of mul- 
tiplying one hundred fold the value of the latter, by fash- 
ioning them with durability, elegance, and perfection ; 
and when the perfection of mechanics, sparing manual 
labour, admits of their commanding for the productions 
of their manufactures a superior market ; then the whole 
progress of civilization, whether in extent or in rapidity, 
are so many augmentations of their capital. It is with 
the surplusage of productive labour over the consump- 
tion of the interior, that a nation procures foreign mer- 
chandize : and the more numerous the productions it 
has to receive, the more will it be able and willing to 
buy. A taste for the conveniences of life, the enjoy- 
ments of luxury, and of all the external embellishments 
of life, may be diffused among all classes, multiplied and 
varied ad infinitum. A nation which knows how to sa- 
tisfy this taste in a thousand ways must add to the com- 
forts of its own population and to the luxuries of others. 
The experience of several years seems to have proved 
that England can subsist her population although shut 
out froni the Continent, but not without submitting to 
privations. The other three quarters of the globe are 
more open than ever to her mercantile speculations, to 
her colonial establishments, and even to her conquests, 
if such were necessary to maintain her prosperity. We 
do not mean to say that European connections are not 
very important to England, but they are not so much so 
as formerly : a wonderful focus of moral and intellectu- 
al excellence has concentrated, within a space compara- 
tively small, and little favoured by nature, a population 
the most numerous, the most active, and the most pow- 
erful, by the ascendancy of the human mind. But if, by 



47 

this frightful levelling, with which all states are threat r 
ened, the genius of national character is sunk into a 
mechanical uniformity, if the most insolent and illiberal 
despotism should plunge Kuroj)e into misery and into 
barbarism, there would only be a single corner of the 
globe from which it could be excluded : and England, 
remaining like the ark afloat in the midst of the universal 
deluge, will find ample compensation, in directing all 
her efforts towards those vast and rich countries of 
Asia, where civilization has become stationary from its 
antiquity : and towards others still unexplored in Afri- 
ca, America, and the Pacific Ocean, where prodigal na- 
ture only wants the finishing hand of man. Let us not 
forget that there already exists an Europe beyond the 
seas : our languages, our manners, and our arts have 
been carried there : this American Europe is only in 
its infancy, because it has been neglected or badly ad- 
ministered : that part which has become independent 
has sprung up with astonishing rapidity. If there be 
not some happy change in store for our old world, the 
vigorous youth of the new, may speedily put to shame 
the aged decrepitude of the mother-country. In several 
countries confederated with France, projects of emigra- 
tion towards the other hemisphere are treated as state of- 
fences, while the English government, by the wisdom 
of its laws, has in a few years transformed a place of 
transportation for criminals into a flourishing colony. 
Can we mistake the revolutions which are announced by 
those symptoms ? 

So far is England from finding it her interest to fer- 
ment the troubles, and to perpetuate the dissensions 
of the Continent, that she is interested that Europe, after 
twenty years' convulsion, should finally enjoy peace, — a 
peace which shall be guaranteed by the stability of her 
governments, and the re-establishmentof the barriers of 
the independence of every state. Let it not be saidj 
that the English minister pursues a line of policy sepa- 
rate from the interests of the nation : that is rendered 
impossible by the British constitution, by virtue of 
which the government must always give way to th<^ 



wishes of the enlightened majority. England continues 
the war at the expense of immense sacrifices ; she may 
purchase peace with a stroke of the pen, by subscribing 
to the new system of the oppression of the public law of 
Europe. The greatest disappointment would be suf- 
fered by those powers which are still in the field, and 
by those nations which by their own princes have been 
forcibly chained to the chariot-wheels of the usurper. 
England continued adverse to every project of conquest 
in Europe, notwithstanding the allurements which pre- 
sented themselves : she has been always faithful to her 
engagements, and always zealous in succouring such of 
her allies as remained true to themselves. As she ought 
to have done, she has, in the first place, fought for her 
own safety : but it must be at the same time admitted, 
that she has fought with a noble enthusiasm for the 
common cause. 

The ministers of Buonaparte, like official defenders 
of the general anathema against English commerce, 
maintain, that he ought to take advantage of his internal 
commerce, and improve his agricukure and manufac- 
tures ; they say, that England herself has prohibitory 
laws against the importation of foreign commodities. It 
must be in the first place remarked, that exportation is 
also annihilated by the Continental System, since that of 
England is interdicted by the decrees of blockade, and 
there is no navy to protect the remains of the navigation 
of those coimtries which are in a state of hostility against 
her. The carriage by land of goods to great distances 
is so expensive, that it amounts to a prohibition of many 
productions ; and the canals, which ought to supply the 
want of external navigation, as yet are only magnificent 
projects. Measures prohibitory of importation, adopted 
imder proper modifications and regulations, may have a 
good effect, when there isa progressive advance of industry 
and prosperity in a country. For, it is clear, that there 
must be disposable, or at least spare, capitals, in order to 
ameliorate agriculture, and for the cultivation of natural 
productions ; but there is nothing of this kind in France. 
But when the maritime cities, formerly so opulent, are 



49 

ruined by the shutting up of their harbours ; when e\ 
ery kind of industry is crushed by the weight of im- 
posts ; when wars, less sparing of human lives than ev- 
er, make continual drafts upon the population, and an- 
nually carry off a great proportion of young men from 
useful labours ; then the sudden and general prohibition 
of the usual importations must lead to disagreeable re- 
sults. The home manufactories, freed from all rival- 
ship, will produce goods of a high price and bad quali- 
ty ; an artificial high price will be laid upon goods of 
all descriptions ; but, being unable to attain their cus- 
tomary enjoyments, all the world will consent to priva- 
tions ; the deficiencies in the consumption will diminish 
the receipts of the indirect imposts, and force the gov- 
ernment to raise the tarif, or, if possible, to invent new 
ones ; misery and depopulation will increase in a fright- 
ful manner. Thus France, and all the countries under 
her regime, will be impoverished in a twinkling. Let 
us compare Holland, at the present day, with what it 
was previous to 1795 ! After all which it has suffer- 
ed, its junction with France has given it the last blow 
of a public bankruptcy ; for this is the true name of the 
reduction of the national debt to one-third, not of the 
capital, but of interest. Eighteen years have been suffi- 
cient to dissipate the riches, accumulated by wisdom 
and political energy, by economy and commercial activ- 
ity, during upwards of two centuries. The north of 
Germany, in general more distinguished for a careful 
cultivation than for fertility, had acquired a high degree 
of improvement, in consequence of enlightened adminis- 
trations and a long peace. For forty years this country 
had not been the theatre of any war ; it remained tran- 
quil even during those of the revolution, till 1806. The 
Hanseatic cities were more flourishing than ever, be- 
cause commerce, expelled from Holland, took refuge 
there. Within the space of six years, reckoning from 
the Prussian war, or nine since the occupation of Han- 
over, the whole of the north of Germany has been turn- 
ed topsy-turvy. A precise calculator has exerted him- 
self to prove, that, in spite of the pretended prosperity 



50 

of the finances, of which Napoleon's ministers make an 
ostentatious parade, there is a deficit in his receipts, 
which he is constantly obliged to make good by military 
enterprizes ; not daring to diminish his military power, 
and not being able to keep it up with his own resources. 
Be the case as it may, it is certain that not only has he 
brought to the highest point of perfection the art of sub- 
sisting his troops at the expense of the enemy ; but, 
even in the intervals of peace, he scarcely permits them 
to return to France. The most fortunate of his allies 
are those through whose states his numerous armies 
have only occasion to pass ; other countries have the 
burden of providing for all their wants during a long 
residence. He is at all times particular in having some 
country in reserve to be given up to plunder until its 
fate be definitively settled ; when there is absolutely 
nothing more to extort, he then unites it to the Grand 
Empire, or generously gives it to some ally. The for- 
tunate inhabitants of Sweden, who have never seen one 
of Buonaparte's armies inundate their country, cannot 
conceive how expensive his friendships have been ; ev- 
ery petty district of Germany can furnish melancholy de- 
tails on this subject. 

The obstinate partisans of Napoleon assert, that these 
are mere transitory evils, arising out of the resistance to 
his grand plans of regeneration ; that the population of 
Europe have nothing to do but to take arms against 
their antient governments ; and, when once firmly con- 
nected with the Federal system of France, the war is 
removed from their frontiers ; while, under the shade 
of her protecting power, their losses are quickly repair- 
ed. But is there any room for breathing by the side of 
such indefatigable ambition ? Napoleon demands of his 
allies, as if they were his subjects, men and money. 
His demands are not proportioned to their means, but 
to his own want-i, always urgent and always exorbitant. 
It forms no part of his character to husband resources ; 
he recognizes no future beyond his next enterprize. 

Tlie confederate princes are, therefore, obliged to 
have constantly on foot a military establishment beyond 



51 

ail proportion to their population and revenues ; while 
the troops of Buonaparte live at discretion among them^ 
they remain charged with the pay of their own troops 
and with all their expenses when these troops'are em- 
ployed in far distant wars, with which their countries 
have no concern ; — the contingents of every confedera- 
ted state are fixed in appearance ; but what does this 
serve, when the will of their master is sufficient to 
double or triple them ? Besides, it is not stipulated that 
the auxiliaries shall furnish a certain number of men once 
for all during every war ; on the contrary, in proportion 
as the sword of the enemy destroys the soldiers, and the 
diseases of strange climates carry them off, the blanks 
must be filled up ; and, as he is in preference prodigal 
of auxiliaries, it is a gulf, the vast depth of which swal- 
lows up every thing which comes within its vortex ! 

As the offensive alliance between the Great Empire 
and states of the second and third degree is always at the 
expense of the latter, every thing is to the advantage of 
the«most powerful, and the people are not permitted to 
have a vote in their own affairs. As a consequence, the. 
vassal kings ought to be equally absolute among their 
subjects as their master is in France, but Napoleon has 
made them abject. 

Since the age of Louis XIV. the French have been 
accustomed to give the law to Europe. The lustre of 
this reign, celebrated by arms and learning ; the uni- 
versality of the French language ; the animated polite- 
ness of their manners ; every thing concurred to render 
to France, from all Europe, the voluntary homage of 
imitation. This European ascendancy become frivo- 
lous under the regency and under Louis XV. introduc- 
ing every where among the great, religious and moral 
incredulity, as easily as changes in dress and fashion, 
was,neyertheless,very advantageous to the success of the 
revolution. France then wished to give to Europe, and 
to the whole world, Parisian modes in politics, and con- 
stitutions were accepted with ecstacy, because they were 
shaped in the modern temple of taste ! That forms of 
government ought to be adapted to the character, the 



52 

faculties, and the latitudes of every nation, and to the 
localities of every country, so that any sudden and un- 
expected change might produce no durable eifect, — 
truths so evident that they struck the common sense of 
every one, — were misconceived by the missionaries of the 
revolutionary propaganda. They wished to communi- 
cate to the whole human race the benedictions of their 
new order, (or rather social disorder,) before they had 
tasted it themselves. At first, national assemblies were 
every where convoked ; afterwards the Luxembourg 
Directory brought fordi little Directories, Cisalpine, Ba- 
tavian, and Helvetic ; some time afterwards there was a 
President, or a Grand Pensionary nominated by the First 
Consul ; and, finally, there is now every where an Abso- 
lute Monarchy under the Napoleon dynasty. This phe- 
nomenon was, till then, unknown in Europe ; monar- 
chies, which passed for the least limited, were, in fact, 
limited in a thousand ways : by the influence of the no- 
blesse and of the clergy ; by antient usages, which they 
durst not infringe ; by the emulation of liberality, which, 
in the 18th century, existed in all governments ; by the 
force of European opinion ; and, finally, by the liberty 
of the press, which, if it were any where oppressed, took 
refuge in a neighbouring state. In France, the level- 
lers, in the name of republican equality, paved the way 
for despotism : nothing but the throne was raised above 
' the dust : the new prerogatives and distinctions of rank 
are only phantoms which their invention can annihilate. 
The regime of Buonaparte is generally composed of two 
elements : one of them revolutionary measures rendered 
permanent by a methodical execution ; the other, the 
abuses of antient royalty revived and multiplied. There 
was once a single Bastile in France : he has erected 
eight : every thing is in the same proportion. The 
luxury of the antient court gave great offence : it was 
humble and modest compared with the pomp of the new ! 
The kings of his creation have imitated him in this res- 
pect : feeling their own want of moral dignity, they 
think to impose on the vulgar by external pomp. 



In short, the infallible consequences of the Continen- 
tal System, to every state, are, the ruin of commerce 
and industry ; overwhelming taxes ; the overthrow of 
all constitutional forms ; interminable wars, on account 
of others, equally expensive and sanguinary ; armies 
estranged from their country, and all of them ready to 
turn their arms against their fellow-citizens ; princes, 
incapable of protecting, endowed with an unlimited 
power of oppressing their subjects, and tremblmg, in 
their turn, before their master ; finally, in the midst of 
terror, misery, ignominy, the obligation to erect tri- 
umphal arches, and to sing hymns of adulation. 

I shall finish these pages by hazarding some reflec- 
tions upon the following question : What is the safest, 
the most advantageous, and the most honourable part 
for Sweden to take under present circumstances ? I 
speak of my own accord ; for a humble individual can- 
not be permitted, but with extreme circumspection, to^ 
anticipate the intentions of government. 

An alliance with modern France, or rather with Na- 
poleon, carries with it the necessity of entering into all 
ik\^ principles of the Continental System. I do not sup- 
pose, that all which has been developed on this subject 
will be refuted by the hacknied adage, that France is the 
natural ally of Sweden. Is it now the same France, 
the same Sweden, the same Europe, to which this thesis 
applied ? Formerly, France gave subsidies ; now she 
exacts tributes ; formerly, France had a great naval 
force ; she could efficaciously support the navigation of 
Sweden, in the event of an attack from England. 
France has now no navy ; and, as soon as any power 
is allied with her, it runs the risk of losing its own : 
formerly, France was separated from Sweden by a num- 
ber of states placed between them : at present they ad- 
join each other, for France has Denmark at her dispo- 
sal : formerly, of all the powers of Europe, France was 
most intimately connected with the Porte ; she could by 
her influence make an useful diversion for Sweden, in 
the event of a rupture with Russia. At present, France 
is a frontier to Turkey, and her projects of conquest are 



54 

unequivocal. As every thing has clianged, so has the 
meaning of the expression, natural ally, changed also. 
While any equilibrium existed, challenges were gener- 
ally sent to adjoining states. Countries which were re- 
moved to such a distance as to prevent them from com- 
ing in collision, but which nevertheless could help each 
other indirectly, were reputed natural allies. At pres- 
ent, when revolutionary politics have subjugated two- 
thirds of the Continent, and attempt to overturn what- 
ever still remains unshaken, all the states which are able 
and willing to maintain their independence, and to fortify 
it by the dissolution of the federal system of France, 
ought to unite strictly, whether they are neighbours or 
placed at the extremities of Europe, and whatever may 
be their antient relation and even their present quarrels. 
Rivalries, individual claims, and recrimination, ought 
to be forgotten, in order to labour with one common 
accord in a danger so urgent. 

But since there are persons who think they have found, 
in the past, rules for their conduct at present ; since we 
meet with prejudices which are, as it were, petrified in 
the heads of those who like better to repeat the lessons 
received in their youth, than to ob&erve and reflect for 
themselves ; let us take the trouble to examine the 
history of the alliances between Sweden and France, and 
we shall find that the former never reaped any abund- 
ant fruits. In the seventeenth century, France, in fact, 
contributed by subsidies to place Gustavus Adolphus 
I. in a condition to undertake that war which was so 
glorious for Sweden ; but her assistance was always 
hollow, the French ministry were jealous of her succes- 
ses, and in the negociation for the peace of Westphalia 
they intrigued in every possible way to defeat the advan- 
tages which her efforts had gained. One of the most 
respectable Swedish politicians, Chancellor Oxenstiern, 
drew up, in 1692, a memoir, in which he strongly de- 
precates, with most judicious arguments, an alliance 
with France.* This was nevertheless the glorious age 
of Lewis XIV. 

* The memoir is inserted in the Reclierches sur les alliances entre la Suede 
et la France, par Eoxisset . 



55 

This will be sufficient to prove to our readers, that 
even formerly the opinion of enlightened men in Swe- 
den has not been unanimous, as to the system which 
ought to be pursued towards France. But we repeat, 
that the circumstances in which Europe is placed are so 
extraordinary, that no commonplace diplomatist can 
meet theni. 

Sweden has a right to remain neutral ; but we have 
seen that Napoleon admits of no neutrality ; that he re- 
gards as enemies all those who do not assist him in 
making a negative war against England. If for the 
moment he cannot prevent the neutrality of a state, he 
will bear it in mind, and will seize the first opportunity 
of revenging himself, by throwing that state into such a 
dependent condition that it can never rise. 

To hazard a wish to preserve independence, without 
forming positive connection with the powers coalesced 
against Napoleon, would be to attract his resentment.. 
On the other hand, what must be done to satisfy him ? 
Shut our ports hermetically against the English, and as 
a consequence submit to see them blockaded ; deprive 
ourselves not only of the advantage of mutual exportation 
between Sweden and England, but of the possibility of 
all navigation and all external commerce ; treat as state 
criminals the inhabitants of states, which, for want of 
other resources, would attempt to resist regulations 
so rigorous ; diminish the revenues of the state, like 
those of individuals ; expose ourselves to famine in 
consequence of obstacles which the English can inter- 
pose to the arrival of grain from the Baltic and to the 
coasting-trade : these are the sacrifices which Napole- 
on requires from Sweden, for an indefinite time, with- 
out holding out any return except from time to time a 
majestic sign of approbation. These presumptuous 
demands are so insulting, that, laying aside all self- 
interest, the sentiment of national dignity alone ought 
to induce us to reject them. 

In order to see with their own eyes what it costs a 
maritime power to have Napoleon for an ally, the Swedes 
have only to look at their neighbours, the Danes. I 



56 

have omitted to speak of the affairs of Denmark, because, 
in the general progress of events, they have only been 
of secondary importance^ Much praise has been bes- , 
towed upon the neutrality which this government has 
professed since the commencement of the wars of the 
revolution. This conduct was, nevertheless, but a pit- 
iful mercantile speculation. Sunk in profound apathy 
during the revolutions of Europe, Denmark had noth- 
ing in view but the momentary advantages of her com- 
merce, without ever dreaming that the fall of so many 
states would soon shake the basis of her own political 
existence, ' The fact is, that Denmark, after having 
done a great deal of mischief to the coalesced powers, 
has, in the end, drawn upon herself irreparable evils. 
The British government, after having long tolerated a 
neutrality, (entirely to its disadvantage,) finally saw it- 
self obliged to take precautions for its safety in a contest 
which it maintained alone against so many enemies. 
But it was content with disarming Denmark, by seizing 
her fleet ; and it evacuated Zealand, already conquered, 
which it might easily have kept by its sea and land for- 
ces, and continued to make war against the Danes, with 
that moderation which it had adopted as a principle, 
when hostilities were committed, by less powerful states, 
at the instigation of France. 

The king of Denmark, during the war of the empire, 
from 179rto 1 801, never furnished the contingent, that 
be was bound to do as a member of the Germanic Body. 
On the contrary, the Danes took the odious part of con- 
tributing to rivet the chains of Germany, by sending 
troops to overwhelm the unfortunate Schill. Without 
entering into the Rhenish confederation, the king of 
Denmark behaved like the princes, who engaged in that 
league, by annulling his own authority as duke of Hol- 
stein, by destroying the privileges of the inhabitants of 
that province, and by subjugating them to the absolute 
laws of his monarchy. Neither the abdication of its 
chief, the only consequence of which should have been 
a new election, nor the violent acts of some disloyal prin- 
ces, could extinguish the Germanic empire : it did ex- 
ist, it still exists^ if not de facto, at least de jure^ and 



57 

the time is approaching when the nation may realize its 
reclamations against so many scandalous usurpations. 

By a blindness, similar to that of another cabinet, the 
Danish minister always considered the German cause 
as foreign and unimportant with respect to the security 
of the state : It was not long before he was undeceived. 
Since the peace of Tilsit, Napoleon reigned in the north 
of Germany ; nevertheless, people still flattered them- 
selves that he reserved that part of Hanover which is 
next to Denmark, as an instrument of negociation with 
England, and which he would, perhaps, have restored 
at peace. This hope vanished ; the formal incorpora- 
tion of Hanover carried the French empire to the fron- 
tiers of Denmark ; and, in order that his design might 
not be misconceived, Napoleon extended his frontiers, 
by a narrow neck of land, to the Baltic sea. Thus, the 
provinces of the Danish monarchy, which touched the 
Continent, the duchies of Holstein, Sleswic, and Jutland, 
were, in a manner, inclosed by France, having no long- 
er any inland communication but by her permission. 
On the other hand, the English, blockading the shores 
of Denmark, after threatening a descent, and cruising in 
those branches of the sea which separate the different 
provinces, interrupted the communications even between 
the government and its subjects. The result of friend- 
ship with France was, for Denmark, the loss of her na- 
vy and her colonies ; the impossibility of all navigation 
naturally followed, or, at least, it became extremely diffi- 
cult, to a state almost entirely consisting of islands or of 
peninsulas. 

Norway is frequently exposed to famine, without 
there being any possibility of assisting her with the grain 
with which Zealand abounds ; at least she must wait 
until the winter passes away, which prevents English 
vessels from visiting her shores. This state of things 
has lasted upwards of five years, the^^finances are at the 
lowest ebb, and paper- money has fallen almost as low 
as the assignats : private individuals are ruined as well 
as the state. And what recompense has Denmark re- 
ceived from her powerful ally ? That of not having been 
devoured. This is no trifling favour ; but let us wait a 



58 

little. Napoleon is in no haste to seize a body which 
is within his grasp. If he terminate the present war 
successfully, what a miracle will it not require to save 
Denmark ? If, on the contrary, the coalesced powers 
succeed, she runs the greatest risks, because, on the 
general shock, she is placed at the outposts of the French 
empire. Upon this last supposition, if the Danish gov- 
ernmerit does not make common cause with the allies, 
the downfal and dismemberment of her monarchy are 
inevitable. 

To return to Sweden, with whom an amicable alli- 
ance with England appears an indispensable requisite to 
secure its maritime prosperity ; and which, from its 
geographical position, it is peculiarly calculated to en- 
force with every possible advantage. 

At this critical period, and during the suspension of 
British commercial intercourse with the Continent, the 
British government should duly appreciate the advanta- 
ges of renewing and strengthening their former ties with 
such states a? command an extent of sea-coast. It 
should seek to promote navigation and commerce ; and 
the present moment is singularly favourable for this 
purpose. England wants European ports and inlets ; 
she fears no rival on the seas, where her fiag flies almost 
always triumphant. — She is absolutely oppressed by the 
weight of her colonial conquests j at least, it is certain 
that she has made several with no other benefit than that 
of taking them from the enemy, as they can afford her 
nothing to export of which she had not already a super- 
abundance. Why, then, does not Sweden obtain from 
the English government some of her colonies in return 
for her effectual co-operations ? — Why does not her 
commercial system invigorate and strengthen itself, 
while that of Holland, of Denmark, and the Hanseatic 
towns are paralyzed ? Why should not Sweden, situa- 
ted between two seas, and intersected by numerous fine 
lakes, not avail herself of this advantageous position ? — 
From time immemorial her inhabitants have been fed by 
the watery elements that surround, what may be termed 
the Scandinavian peninsula. While their ancestors vie wed 



59 

the perils which encircle their dangerous coast, the float- 
ing islands of ice, and the bleak storms to which a north- 
em climate is subject, they only laughed, because these 
were dangers which they were accustomed to meet in 
their remote expeditions, and the first mention of them 
in history is that of bold, intrepid navigators. Why 
should not the Swedes retrace the footsteps of their 
illustrious forefathers, qualifying at the same time that 
spirit of enterprize with the progress of civilization ? 
An extensive and most brilliant perspective now opens 
for commercial speculations. — Let Sweden, then, hast- 
en to avail herself of all those natural and collateral advan- 
tages of which a combination of extraordinary circum- 
stances seems to put her in the full possession. 

If Europe is raised up again, they will be before-hand : 
if she is condemned to remain bowed down with a rod 
of iron, her navigation will be annihilated with all the 
rest of the civilized -arts and sciences. The exports 
from each of the subjugated harbours would be guarded 
with invincible Herculean pillars, impregnable even to 
the despotism of the conqueror ; — and while his slaves 
with difficulty till the ground bedewed with tears of 
bloo^, the nations which are free, such as the English 
and the Swedes, in security will plough the turbulent 
ocean as if it were extensively their inheritance. 

It is not to be doubted, that whatever tends to consol- 
idate peace and harmony, to reanimate and multiply a 
mutual regard between England and Sweden, should 
be in this last-named country alike conformable to the 
wants and interest of the labouring class of men ; — to 
their natural inclination, and, it may be said, to the 
moral genius of the nation at large, and to the wishes of 
the enlightened individual. 

Let us now consider its political relation with Russia. 
So long as Sweden retained the transmarine provinces 
bordering upon that empire, there always existed a poini 
of hostile contact between the two states. When Peter 
the Great laid the first stone to erect a new capital at the 
extremity of his vast empire, on a territory snatched 
from the Swedish dominions, he laid the foundation of a 
long struggle between these nations.— Russia had to 



60 

defend a frontier too near the seat of government not to 
cause her uneasiness, whenever she was obliged to carry 
her forces to any distance ; at present, the sea and the 
frozen regions form a bulwark between her and a neigh- 
bouring power often formidable. Now, that there can be 
no war between Russia and Sweden, actuated by motives 
of reciprocal security, Sweden has become, as it were, 
an island on that side of the coast, having nothing to fear 
from Russia ; hence she becomes her most natural ally, 
besides which both states have a common interest in the 
Baltic, and which has already induced them more than 
once to concentrate and unite their maritime strength. 

We must think of repairing our losses, but not obsti- 
nately seek for that reparation exactly on the vulnerable 
side of the question, to maintain which has so long ab- 
sorbed the greatest part of the forces of the Empire. 
Divided and disunited states, it is well known, do not 
yield their sovereign that vigour which they would do 
were they concentrated to a focus, and formed a whole, 
composed of one substance : besides this, from the ne- 
cessity of keephig these possessions in a state of defence, 
the policy of the government becomes complicate and 
dependant on local circumstances. It is not enough to 
increase our good fortune, but infinitely more important 
to circumscribe its limits. — Every government should 
form and hold its own boundary, and which, of its nature, 
should be rendered very difficult if not impossible to 
break. It is then that it enjoys without alloy its own 
independence ; when it lias nothing to fear in its exter- 
nal relations, and cannot be entangled against its will in 
systems contrary to its ovyn interest. 

Many states, from their geographical position, are 
doomed to be perpetually in collision between their 
neighbours on every new rupture ; but Sweden, protect- 
ed even by nature, should aspire to give herself a com- 
pact and almost insular integrity ; this would invigorate 
her strength infinitely more than any territorial acquisi- 
tion or increase of population could do. The union of 
Calmar, formerly brought with it a series of con- 
straint and oppression ; but we might be surprised 
that, in the schisms that followed between these three 



61 

kingdoms, still represented in the armorial bearings of 
Sweden, the two, situate nearest the sea-coast, have not 
remained united ; and to consider the excuse abstract- 
edly, without entering into details of the circumstance, 
it would appear merely an accidental event. 

The acquisition of Norway to Sweden, the most de- 
sirable of any she could make, precisely is the one that 
would give to Napoleon the greatest offence, and the 
one to which he would least accede so long as he could 
oppose it. How would he ever agree to bind, in a 
manner never to be undone, the independence of a gov- 
ernment already too far beyond his reach, when his chief 
policy consists in taking away, successively, from each 
state, whatever degree of independence they maintained^ 
and compelling them to participate in foreign wars, even 
when in opposition to their own interest ? How would 
he consent to give Sweden a greater extent on the sea- 
coast, and thus make her more anxious to avoid hostili- 
ties with England ? Never would he have given to 
Sweden any other than such precarious possessions, in 
return for her alliance on the offensive ; while, in watch- 
ing over their preservation, she would be under the ne- 
cessity of abiding by his will, and of co-operating in the 
execution of all his desis-ns^ 

The Swedes, so illustrious in history, possess an in- 
nate sentiment of dignity. The nation has chosen the 
best means of repairing adverse times, by calling a 
prince to the throne, for whom they feel admiration 
blended with die homage due to the sovereign. In this 
election we behold the dawn of a glorious day ; and at- 
tachment to Sweden, valour, and the genius of an expe- 
rienced warrior, are the indispensable qualifications for 
the chief of an empire, tottering amidst the shocks that 
have engulphed so many other nations, because their 
princes knew not how to conduct their own subjects to 
the field of battle. During long and bloody wars, ma- 
ny generals have acquired the reputation of being Jear- 
iess of danger ; but it is rare indeed to have been with- 
out reproach in an epoch of civil commotions. The 
Prince-Royal of Sweden has displayed chivalry in re 



/ 



62 

publicanism as well as in royalty ; — France is indebted 
to him for having defended her in the most critical peri- 
ods, long before her present ruler was distinguished, who 
has subsequently, by a thousand artifices, caparisoned 
himself with military glory. 

The different countries, which were the theatres of 
his exploits, have praised his endeavors to soften, and 
mitigate, the evils of war, and relieve suffering humani- 
ty : Sweden beheld him on her shores, identify himself 
with her citizens by sentiments of patriotism, which no 
sovereign of Scandinavian blood ever surpassed. For 
the last two years, the king's reliance on his successor, 
and on the uprightness of his future plans, has powerful- 
ly contributed to the re-establishment of order in the 
interior of the country. Private safety is secured by a 
due respect paid to public order ; a spirit of moderation 
and unanimity presides in the assemblies of the represen- 
tatives ; commerce and navigation have re-assumed 
their wonted activity ; and the youthful defenders of 
their country exercise their military talents, with fervour 
and zeal, under the auspices of a hero. The Swedes 
will follow with unlimited confidence their chief, who 
has devoted himself wholly to them, and they require 
nothing more to restore them to the brightest and most 
exalted situation. That energetic caimness, which se- 
cured on its base the edifice of social institutions, mani- 
fested itself also in its external relations. A style replete 
with dignity, justice, and moderation, resounded from 
the utmost corner of the north, and astonished all Eu- 
rope ; already, without appearing to have acted abroad, 
Sweden, in the general state of affairs, has exercised an 
important and salutary influence. The friendship that 
so long subsisted between her and the Sublime Porte 
facilitated the conclusion of peace with Russia, though 
France, by every means in her power, endeavoured to 
prevent it. The Divan, sensible that it was its real 
interest to cede a part of its territory rather than to 
accept of any guarantee of integrity from Buonaparte, 
offered, as a bait, to continue the war. Great Britain 
and Russia are so intimately connected with each oth- 
er, that any suspension of amicable intercourse between 



63- 

them must be of a violent nature, and of short duration. 
Sweden, lying in the direct road of communication, is, 
as it were, the intermediate Hnk of the chain. They 
both seek her friendship and respect her independence^ 
as the surest guarantees against the continental system 
of subjugating the Baltic. 

In the interview between the emperor Alexander and 
the Prince Royal of Sweden, to whom the king had con= 
lided the secrets, of the state, the two nations cast all for- 
mer animosities between them into oblivion for ever ; 
and, as the Prince Regent of England had also a repre- 
sentative there, the unanimity of three such magnani- 
mous sovereigns proclaims the developement of a policy 
contrary to the subtilty of egotism, a conduct full of 
liberality, and enlightened patriotism. Hence the dis- 
asters, which I have feebly attempted to point, are not, 
by the assistance of Divine Providence, without a reme- 
•dy. Since the commencement of our woes, never have 
circumstances concurred so forcibly to augur that our 
deliverance is near at hand. Russia, for a while, ap- 
peared overwhelmed ; and had it not been for the steady 
and unshaken perseverance of the emperor, supported 
by his devoted and heroic subjects, she must have fallen. 
The extravagant pretensions of the aggressor created a 
civil war ; it spread its ravages, like a devastating tor- 
rent, towards the east : meanwhile, Spain had scarcely 
time to breathe, when another Marlborough arises to 
re-estabhsh the fame of British arms ; and, by his glori- 
ous victories, re-animate the enthusiastic spirit of the 
Spanish nation. That nation, although conquered, was 
never subdued. On the other hand, by her internal 
operations, Sweden essentially served the common 
cause, by keeping Buonaparte's troops and his allies at 
bay, on the opposite coast. Germany is awakened to 
revived hope, and impatient to throw off the yoke. Na- 
poleon has actually worn out and abused his good for- 
tune ; she alone was worth all his other adherents ; he 
has no friends, and his allies scarcely strive to conceal 
their joy when they hear of his defeats. His power re- 
sembles a colossus composed of heterogeneous metals, 
and it3 earthen feet is the hatred of the people. To-dav 



64 

this gigantic idol is adored ; to-morrow it falls to the 
ground, and the world only views it as a fragile monu- 
ment of arrogant, inordinate pride ! 

Nations of the continent !— Let not a false security 
lull you to sleep. — If he is permitted to take breath on 
his reverses, he will convince the world of what may 
still be done by subterfuge and effrontery ; his wrath 
wilt have no bounds against those who have unveiled his 
weakness,-— the weakness of a mortal ! — He ! — the arbi- 
ter of destinies, the god of adulation 1 ! ! What is the 
loss of a whole army to Buonaparte, who, to use his 
own expression, " has so many men at his disposal ?" 
It is not enough that he should have been unsuccessful 
in the war of annihilation, but he must be rendered inca- 
pable of waging war in future, — he must be compelled 
to give up his system of universal sovereignty, and eve- 
ry pre^^\ision incompatible with the independence of 
nations alid the tranquillity of the world at large. 

In this momentous crisis, big' with the future, from 
which there is no appeal, many nations will undergo a 
serious change. It is easy to foresee the fate of those 
governments, under Buonaparte's control, who pertina- 
ciously adhere to his cause. Those who remain neuter 
cannot expect, that, in the conflict of so many jarring 
interests, they will be supported by the powers they 
have declined to assist, or that the latter will endanger 
themselves ; thence, they cannot look for a gratuitous 
remuneration for what, in their narrow policy, they may 
have lost. Those powers, who have united to serve the 
good cai.se, will be seated in the front row, and their 
voices will preponderate in the senate of sovereigns, in 
whom will be invested the mighty work of re-establish- 
ing the European constitution on a more firm and solid 
base. Can the Swedish nation ever cease to remember, 
that one of her brightest claims to fame was that advan- 
tageous peace she made at Westphalia, after a long 
struggle with her enemies abroad ; a peace, which for 
upwards of an hundred and fifty years, was considered 
the foundation of the rights of all the nations of Europe, 

THE END. 



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